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THE CONSTITUTIONAL IRRELEVANCE OF ART* 
BRIAN SOUCEK** 
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the baker’s lead argument to the Supreme Court 
was that his cakes were artworks, so antidiscrimination laws could not apply. 
Across the country, vendors who refuse to provide services for same-sex weddings 
continue making similar arguments on behalf of their floral arrangements, 
videos, calligraphy, and graphic design, and the Supreme Court will again be 
asked to consider their claims. 
But arguments like these—what we might call “artistic exemption claims,” akin 
to the religious exemptions so much more widely discussed—are actually made 
throughout the law, not just in public accommodations cases like Masterpiece 
Cakeshop. In areas ranging from tax and tort, employment and contracting 
discrimination, to trademark, land use, and criminal law, litigants argue that 
otherwise generally applicable laws simply do not apply to artists or their 
artworks. This Article collects these artistic exemption claims together for the 
first time in order to examine what determines their occasional success—and to 
ask when and whether they should succeed. 
The surprising answer is that claims of the form “x is protected because it is art” 
should never succeed. The category “art” is constitutionally irrelevant. Contrary 
to widespread assertion among scholars and advocates, a work’s status as art has 
never done any work in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment case law. 
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Instead, the Supreme Court emphasizes individual mediums of expression—
categories like paintings and protest marches, books and billboards. Compared 
to the category “art,” these mediums of expression are better defined, easier to 
administer, and more relevant to that which the law most likely and legitimately 
wants to regulate. Yet they have gotten far less attention from scholars and lower 
courts than they deserve. 
Understanding the constitutional irrelevance of art—and the constitutional 
importance of mediums—casts new light on some of the most prominent recent 
and looming artistic exemption claims at the Supreme Court: not just those made 
in same-sex wedding cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop and its kin but also 
those made in challenges to race discrimination in television and in criminal 
threat prosecutions brought against rappers. Asking whether a cake, a TV show, 
or a rap song is art uselessly distracts from the difficult issues actually at stake in 
those important cases and in First Amendment doctrine more broadly. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The artist Arne Svenson secretly photographed his neighbors through 
their apartment windows in Manhattan and sold the pictures in a nearby 
gallery.1 Under New York privacy law, using someone’s likeness for commercial 
purposes without their permission is illegal. 2 But when his neighbors sued, 
Svenson successfully argued that the law did not apply because the images 
Svenson sold were works of art.3 
Elsewhere in New York City, artists wanted to sell their paintings, 
sculptures, prints, and photographs on city streets.4 Street vendors normally 
need a permit, but the artists claimed that this would unconstitutionally restrict 
their artistic expression. 5  They won. 6 A decade later, graffiti artists selling 
spray-painted hats and shirts made the same claim.7 They lost.8 
A town in Texas banned junked vehicles in people’s yards.9 A businessman 
there claimed that the inoperable Oldsmobile in front of his store—filled with 
plants and painted with local scenes—was a work of art, not a junked car, so the 
ordinance shouldn’t apply.10 
The Bachelor television franchise was sued for race discrimination after it 
failed to cast a single Black bachelor or bachelorette in its first twenty-four 
seasons.11 The case was dismissed at the pleading stage because it threatened to 
affect the creative content of an “artistic form[] of expression.”12 
After being arrested on drug and weapon charges, a teenager in 
Pennsylvania described online how he was going to maim and kill the police 
officers who arrested him.13 Courts were asked to decide whether the teen could 
avoid additional charges of terroristic threats and witness intimidation because 
he said what he did within a rap song.14 
Cook County, Illinois, exempts small theaters from paying sales tax on 
tickets to live musical performances.15 Yet it imposed the tax on venues where 
 
 1. Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150, 153 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). 
 2. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (Westlaw through L.2021, ch. 1 to 49, 61 to 68).  
 3. Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 159. 
 4. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 5. Id. at 698. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 81 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 10. Id. at 324–36. 
 11. Claybrooks v. Am. Broad. Cos., 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). 
 12. Id. at 988. 
 13. Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1148–49 (Pa. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Knox v. 
Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019). 
 14. Id. at 1152–53. 
 15. COOK COUNTY, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 74-391 to -92 (LEXIS 2015 Cook County 
Ill. Mun. Code Archive). 
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DJs, rappers, country singers, and rock bands performed. 16  Musical 
performances like these, the county said, were not “commonly regarded as part 
of the fine arts.”17 The venues refused to pay, arguing that the tax officials 
should not get to decide what is art—even as they fought for tax exemptions 
available only to the arts.18 
*    *    * 
Cases like these—which this Article brings together for the first time—
raise what we might call “artistic exemption claims”: arguments that an 
otherwise generally applicable law should not apply to someone or something 
because that someone is an artist or that something is art. 
Artistic exemption claims resemble the religious exemption claims 
discussed in so many recent cases, newspapers, and law review articles. From 
anti-vaxxers 19  to adoption agencies, 20  Hobby Lobby 21  to Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 22 religious exemptions generate ever more legal controversy and 
 
 16. Id. (limiting the exemption to the “fine arts, such as live theater, music, opera, drama, comedy, 
ballet, modern or traditional dance, and book or poetry readings”). 
 17. Id. Cook County has since amended its ordinance to remove “fine” from the term “fine arts.” 
COOK COUNTY, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 74-391 to -92 (LEXIS through Ordinance No. 20-
4356, enacted October 22, 2020). 
 18. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 1–2, Cook Cnty. Dep’t of Revenue v. Wladyslaw Kowynia, 
Inc., No. D15050079 (Cook Cnty. Dep’t of Admin. Hearings Mar. 31, 2017) (settled). 
 19. See, e.g., Lauren Sausser, Parenting: Religious Exemptions to Child Vaccine Requirements Keep 
Rising in South Carolina, POST & COURIER (June 17, 2018), https://www.postandcourier.com/ 
columnists/parenting-religious-exemptions-to-child-vaccine-requirements-keep-rising-in/article_6450 
8ab6-6d9e-11e8-b351-3b711fcbe895.html [https://perma.cc/GGD2-KE8F]; cf. ALA. CODE § 16-30-3 
(Westlaw through Act 2020-206) (providing a religious exemption from Alabama’s vaccination 
requirement). 
 20. See, e.g., H.B. 837, 111th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2020) (providing that no private 
child-placing agency shall be required to make placements that violate their religious or moral 
convictions); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 
(2020) (mem.). 
 21. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688–91 (2014) (granting closely held 
corporate employers a religious exemption from having to include birth control coverage in their 
employee health insurance plans). 
 22. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). In Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, a Christian cake “artist” sought an exemption from Colorado’s public accommodations law 
on both religious and artistic grounds. Id. at 1723; id. at 1742 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (examining the artistic exemption claim made by the cake “artist”). Being 
required to create cakes for same-sex weddings, the baker said, not only would violate his religious 
beliefs but would also amount to government-compelled art making. See Jack Phillips, Can I Just Be a 
Cake Artist Again?, DENVER POST (Mar. 8, 2019, 12:47 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/03/ 
08/jack-phillips-can-i-just-be-a-cake-artist-again/ [https://perma.cc/V847-KDNG]. All but two 
Justices dodged the artistic exemption claim when Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided in 2018, but the 
Court has already been asked to consider such claims again. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1742 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 
i, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, No. 19-333 (Sept. 11, 2019) (asking whether the Washington 
state antidiscrimination law can require a “Christian artist who imagines, designs, and creates floral 
art” to “create custom art that celebrates sacred ceremonies that violate her faith”). 
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scholarly discussion. But similarly widespread and important exemption claims 
brought on behalf of art and artists have gotten little attention at all. 
As the examples at the start already suggest, artistic exemption claims 
range widely across the law, from tax and tort to land use, antidiscrimination, 
and criminal law. Some have been successful, while others have not. But no one 
has yet given an account of what determines their success or whether or when 
they deserve to succeed. And more fundamentally, no one has previously 
questioned whether the umbrella term “art” picks out an appropriate—or even 
definable—category of things meriting protection. No one has paused to ask 
whether the concept of art should be doing any constitutional work. 
To ask this is decidedly not to ask whether individual works of art should 
receive constitutional protection. The question here is not whether Joni 
Mitchell’s songs, Ernest Hemingway’s The Snows of Kilimanjaro, or Kehinde 
Wiley’s portrait of President Obama are covered under the First Amendment. 
Each of these works clearly is covered, though scholars have sometimes 
struggled to explain why.23 The question here is whether works like these are 
covered because they are art. 
The answer to that question is no. Scholars assume, litigants argue, and 
lower courts have at times accepted the idea that “art” picks out a 
constitutionally relevant set of objects and activities deserving of special 
protection under the First Amendment.24 But the U.S. Supreme Court has 
never done so. And nor should it—or so this Article claims. For there are 
alternative concepts at hand which, while hardly perfect, are easier to define 
and more relevant to the task: the mediums of expression that run throughout the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment case law. 
Mediums of expression like music, dance, film, books, paintings, and 
sculpture have long received special treatment—as, more recently, have newer 
 
 23. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, ALAN K. CHEN & JOSEPH BLOCHER, FREE SPEECH BEYOND 
WORDS 70 (2017) (“Every approach one might take to explaining why the First Amendment covers art 
. . . generates odd anomalies.”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 
47 IND. L.J. 1, 29 (1971) (“[A] thoughtful judge is likely to ask how an artistic judgment that is wholly 
idiosyncratic can be capable of supporting an objection to the law. The objection, ‘I like it,’ is 
sufficiently rebutted by ‘we don’t.’” (quoting Walter Berns, Pornography vs. Democracy: The Case for 
Censorship, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1971, at 23)); Marci Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 
108–09 (1996) (“Theories of art’s first amendment content undeniably provide protection to a degree. 
By basing art’s protection on its discursive content, however, these theories compel the courts to find 
such content in every work of art and force them to struggle with artworks whose communicative 
essence is nondiscursive and nonrational.”); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 257 (“Literature and the arts must be protected by the First Amendment. 
They lead the way toward sensitive and informed appreciation and response to the values out of which 
the riches of the general welfare are created.”); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic 
Theory: The Beautiful, the Sublime and the First Amendment, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 221, 223 (“Although 
several [theorists] appear to assume that the first amendment protects some forms of artistic expression, 
they provide no meaningful analysis of why this should be so.”). 
 24. See infra Part I and Sections III.A.2–3. 
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mediums like video games. But this is not because they are art. Non-artistic 
mediums like billboards, yard signs, and leaflets also receive protection, as do 
books, movies, and video games, even when they are not works of art. (This 
Article would be no more protected if it were written in verse and accepted as 
art.) 
Conversely, and more controversially, not every work of art merits First 
Amendment coverage. Attempts to establish amateur rap or Masterpiece 
Cakeshop’s cakes as art are therefore misplaced. The concept of art as an 
umbrella term covering all the arts is not just ill-defined. The best definitions 
of art on offer simply fail to explain why the set of objects and activities they 
identify should all receive special treatment under the law. The concept of art 
thus deserves to be constitutionally irrelevant. 25  Arguments claiming that 
something should be exempt from an otherwise applicable law because it is an 
artwork are therefore unsound. 
Part I of this Article canvasses the previously unacknowledged variety of 
ways and contexts in which these arguments are made. These contexts are 
hardly marginal. In recent years, fights over artistic exemptions have affected 
what can be trademarked, what threats can result in prison time, what access 
LGBTQ couples have to the marketplace, and what entertainment venues get 
taxed in cities and states throughout the country. It is no exaggeration to say 
that art exemption claims have reshaped the streetscape of New York City and 
the racial demographics of our movies, television shows, and plays. 
Some artistic exemption claims arise in court; others are carved out by 
legislatures. Some claims depend on definitional arguments: that an object isn’t 
governed by a particular law because it is an artwork rather than the kind of 
thing (for example a junked car or true threat) the law purports to regulate. 
Others call for a balancing of values: they acknowledge that the law applies but 
argue that art’s value outweighs whatever values the law was meant to advance. 
Part I develops these distinctions before blurring them—showing how 
definitional considerations and value-based balancing ultimately intertwine. 
They come together in courts’ longstanding concern with mediums of expression. 
That is to say, the crucial question in most art exemption cases turns out to be 
neither a definitional one—“Is it art?”—or an evaluative one—“Is it good art?” 
The crucial question usually does not concern art at all. Instead, artistic 
exemption cases more often turn on the nature, value, and definitional limits of 
 
 25. Again, this is not to make artworks themselves strangers to the Constitution. As a unanimous 
Supreme Court noted, the “painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky 
verse of Lewis Carroll” is “unquestionably shielded.” Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual 
Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). But they aren’t shielded because they are works of art. The 
category “art” is not what triggers their protection. 
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the medium of expression to which an object is said to belong. 26  Artistic 
exemption claims, when they succeed, do so because they are made on behalf of 
some member of a recognized medium—painting, for example, or sculpture or 
music—not simply because some object can be labeled a work of art. 
Part II pursues this insight, making the philosophical case why courts are 
correct to focus on individual mediums of expression rather than a more 
sweeping concept like art. The argument goes beyond the standard claim that 
art is hard to define. The problem is not just that philosophers don’t agree on a 
definition—it’s that the definitions on offer are all legally irrelevant. They do 
nothing to explain why a set of things so defined should be treated differently 
by the law than any other sorts of things. Those claiming art exemptions don’t 
just need a definition of art, they need a definition that justifies putting art 
beyond law’s reach. 
By contrast, mediums of expression—which can be generally artistic (like 
music), non-artistic (like billboards or leaflets), or mixed (like books and 
photographs)—have boundaries that may be shifting or blurred but are still far 
sharper than that of art. (We might debate whether a cake from Masterpiece 
Cakeshop is an artwork or not, but it certainly isn’t an opera or photograph.) 
Unlike art in the broad sense—the sense generally used by those making artistic 
exemption claims—mediums of expression tend to have practitioners and 
experts who can help establish the necessary boundaries. And most importantly, 
mediums of expression are distinguished in part by their materiality—the very 
thing law is most likely and legitimately interested in regulating. Theater, 
novels, architecture, and poetry all present different potential harms—harms 
the law may well want to address—but exemptions for “art” would end up 
lumping them together. Whereas mediums of expression do real constitutional 
work, determining whether something is art is just a distraction. 
Part III shows how this insight allows us to see the Supreme Court’s free 
speech cases in importantly new ways. While scholars and litigants have often 
treated arthood as a trigger for First Amendment coverage, the Supreme Court 
never has. And going forward, avoiding talk of art would transform free speech 
arguments currently pending or looming before the Supreme Court: collisions 
between wedding vendors and LGBTQ rights,27 race-based decision-making in 
 
 26. Cf. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) (“Each medium of expression 
. . . must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its 
own problems.”). 
 27. The Court dodged this issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. 
Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018). But discrimination claims have persisted even against 
the petitioner in that case. Sam Brasch, Masterpiece Baker Jack Phillips Is Up Against Yet Another Legal 
Complaint, COLO. PUB. RADIO (June 6, 2019), https://www.cpr.org/2019/06/06/masterpiece-baker-
jack-phillips-is-up-against-yet-another-legal-complaint/ [https://perma.cc/3XXD-RPXY] (describing 
the second and third complaints filed against Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop). And other conflicts 
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the television and theater industries,28 and the criminalization of threats made 
in rap songs.29 Some of the issues in these cases may be genuinely hard, but 
they are made a lot harder by those who think the concept of art has anything 
to do with them. 
In all their varied forms and contexts, artistic exemption claims have one 
thing in common: they treat art as something that should be above the law. This 
Article argues that, within constitutional law, the concept of art should instead 
be irrelevant. 
I.  ARTISTIC EXEMPTION CLAIMS 
To claim an artistic exemption is to demand that some generally applicable 
law should not apply to a person, object, or activity because the person is an 
artist, or the object or activity is art. 
Importantly, “art” is used in this Article in its broad sense, as an umbrella 
term uniting all artistic activity, not just its narrower meaning covering only 
visual art. Here, art includes more than what is studied in an art history 
department or collected in an art museum. When philosophers of art ask the 
age-old question “What is art?,” they are seeking a definition that covers poetry 
and music no less than painting and sculpture. (Whether they succeed is another 
question and one we will return to in Part II.) When we praise someone as “a 
real artist” or call up the cliché of the “struggling artist,” we are as likely to be 
talking about a songwriter, novelist, or dancer as a painter or photographer. 
Googling “a true artist” may summon results about nail salon owners and dog 
groomers alongside articles about people who draw or paint. Tattoo “artists” 
 
between wedding vendors and same-sex couples have continued percolating throughout state and 
federal courts across the country. See, e.g., Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 747–48 (8th 
Cir. 2019); 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 746 Fed. App’x 709, 711–12 (10th Cir. 2018); Brush & Nib 
Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 895 (Ariz. 2018); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 
P.3d 1203, 1209 (Wash. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-333 (Sept. 11, 2019). 
 28. Although the Supreme Court decided one case about race discrimination in cable television 
during its 2019 Term, see Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 
1013 (2020), the Court sidestepped a related case which asked “[w]hether a cable operator has a First 
Amendment right to include racial considerations among the factors it evaluates in making editorial 
determinations as to what programming to carry on its limited bandwidth,” Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at i–ii, Charter Commc’ns. v. Nat’l Ass’n. of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 2561 (2019) 
(mem.) (No. 18-1185). Paul Clement’s petition in that case raised the specter of the musical Hamilton 
having to hire a White actor as George Washington. Id. at 26. (Throughout this Article, “White” and 
“Black” are capitalized, both in keeping with North Carolina Law Review style guidance and for reasons 
well-described by Nell Irvin Painter, Why ‘White’ Should Be Capitalized, Too, WASH. POST (July 22, 
2020, 10:57 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/22/why-white-should-be-
capitalized/ [https://perma.cc/6Z6V-2BSB (dark archive)].) 
 29. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004 (2015); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 
Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (2018), cert. denied sub nom. Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 
1547 (2019) (No. 18-949) [hereinafter Knox, Certiorari Petition]. 
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figure prominently in the results as well.30 In part, this is because art is not just 
a category but also an honorific. The fact that belonging to the category is often 
seen as a form of praise only makes the definitional boundaries harder to 
maintain. 
The struggle to maintain boundaries around the concept of art is a 
dominant theme in the pages to come. But to be clear, the boundaries that 
matter are those that cabin art in its widest sense, for this is the sense in which 
litigants invoke art in the examples that follow.31 The artistic exemption claims 
canvased in this part are made not just for photography, paintings, and film, but 
also for music, dance, and theater—and, as we will see, for wedding cakes, 
junked cars, and potentially endless other types of installations, performances, 
and happenings. Claims on behalf of “art,” thus broadly defined, pervade the 
law, in areas ranging from land use and intellectual property to 
antidiscrimination, criminal, and tax law. The sections that follow take these 
areas in turn. 
These discussions are grouped, however, into what at first seem like two 
different modes of argument—two different types of claims. 
 
 30. See, e.g., True Artists – Association of Certified Tattoo Artists (@TrueArtists), FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/TrueArtists/ [https://perma.cc/WED5-ZYXJ] (describing tattoo artists as 
“True Artists”); Tigra Lorusso, Nail Art, PINTEREST, https://www.pinterest.de/pin/ 
382172718351582112/ [https://perma.cc/E2RV-DD3J] (describing a nail design as “AMAZING! 
TRUE ARTIST!”). 
 31. To say this is not to say that courts, scholars, or litigants are always clear about the two 
different ways in which “art” is used. Take, for example, the recent case of a wedding photographer 
who objected to Louisville’s requirement that she serve customers regardless of their sexual orientation. 
See Chelsey Nelson Photography LLC v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 479 F. Supp. 3d 543 
(W.D. Ky. 2020) (order granting in part and denying in part preliminary injunction). Judge Walker, 
then still presiding over the Western District of Kentucky, found the photographer’s artistic exemption 
claim likely to succeed based on a series of “straightforward principles: 
• Her photography is art. 
• Art is speech. 
• The government can’t compel speech . . . .” 
Id. at 549 (citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit case that the district court cited for its two claims 
about art states that the First Amendment covers both words and “other mediums of expression, including 
music, pictures, films, photographs, paintings, drawings, engravings, prints, and sculptures.” ETW 
Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear that 
the district court’s claim that “[a]rt is speech” is meant to extend to this whole variety of mediums, 
including Chelsey Nelson’s photography. Chelsey Nelson Photography, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 549. Elsewhere 
in the same district court opinion, however, Judge Walker talked of the First Amendment’s 
unquestionable protection of “art, music, and literature.” Id. at 558. There, “art” is used as one medium 
among several, not an umbrella term embracing the visual arts and writing and music. Given its 
importance in the discussion to come, I emphasize the Sixth Circuit’s explicit reference to “mediums 
of expression,” ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 924, over Judge Walker’s broader umbrella term, Chelsey Nelson 
Photography, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 558. Those mediums of expression, rather than “art,” are what the Sixth 
Circuit claims the First Amendment protects. ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 924. 
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On one side are categorization claims. These argue that a law regulating x 
shouldn’t apply to some object or activity, y, because y is not x; y is art. Thus, a 
law banning junked cars should not apply to what is allegedly a sculpture (made 
from a junked car) in someone’s yard. Similarly, an alleged threat should not be 
seen as criminal because it was actually just a rap lyric. Section I.A considers 
claims that take this approach. 
On the other side are balancing claims. These acknowledge that an artistic 
object or activity is precisely the kind of thing the law covers but insist that the 
artwork’s expressive value outweighs whatever value the law intends to 
promote. Artists selling their wares on New York City sidewalks or Masterpiece 
Cakeshop selling cakes in Colorado both admit they are selling goods that would 
otherwise be subject to street vending or public accommodations laws. Their 
claim is that their expressive interests are weightier than the government’s 
interest in avoiding sidewalk congestion (in the former case) or promoting 
equality (in the latter). Section I.B considers these and similar arguments. 
Before doing this, though, it is worth pausing to ask where all these artistic 
exemption claims come from. And here, it may help to compare artistic 
exemptions to the much better-known exemption claims made on behalf of 
religion. 
Like religious exemptions, artistic exemption claims can be based on either 
constitutional protections or statutory carve outs. Constitutional religious 
exemption claims come from the Free Exercise Clause—not very effectively 
since Employment Division v. Smith, 32  but that may soon change. 33 
Constitutional protections for works of art, by contrast, have a less explicit 
source. While other countries provide specific constitutional protections for 
art,34 protections in the United States derive from the First Amendment’s Free 
Speech Clause, and justifying them has long been a matter of controversy, given 
the sometimes awkward or nonobvious fit between art and the marketplace of 
 
 32. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 33. See id. at 880–82 (declining to provide constitutional religion-based exemptions to valid and 
neutral laws of general applicability). But see Brief for Petitioners at 37–52, Fulton v. City of 
Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (No. 19-123) (arguing that Smith should be replaced by a “strict 
scrutiny test for laws which infringe upon religious exercise”). 
 34. See, e.g., Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] [Constitution], art. 5(3), translation at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html [https://perma.cc/J265-7JJQ] (Ger.) 
(“Arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free.”); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal 
Constitutional Court] Feb. 24, 1971, 30 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 
173 (Ger.), translation at https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/ 
case.php?id=1478 [https://perma.cc/7VM5-52V3] (describing the German Basic Law’s “comprehensive 
guarantee of the freedom of artistic activity” and characterizing the “essence of artistic endeavor [as 
lying in] the free creative process whereby the artist, in his chosen communicative medium, gives 
immediate perceptible form to what he has felt, learnt, or experienced”); see also Raman Maroz, The 
Freedom of Artistic Expression in the Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany: A Comparative Analysis, 35 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 341, 358–81 
(2017) (helpfully summarizing the German Constitutional Court’s case law on art). 
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ideas and democratic self-governance—what many see as the main rationales 
for protecting speech.35 
Deepening the constitutional difference between art and religion: there is 
no artistic equivalent to the Constitution’s Establishment Clause, which limits 
the state’s ability to support religion. The fact that the government can, and 
does,36 support the arts in ways it could never support religion may lessen art’s 
need, in comparison to religion’s, for constitutional protection from 
governmental burdens.37 
For now, however, most exemptions claimed on behalf of religion are 
actually not constitutional but rooted in statutory law. The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993,38 for example, provides the possibility of exemptions 
from nearly any federal law that substantially burdens a religious practice.39 
There is no across-the-board equivalent for art. What federal, state, and local 
governments have done instead, and often, is to write specific artistic carve outs 
into particular statutes and regulations. In this, art and religion do prove 
analogous. Legislative carve outs for religion are found in hundreds of federal 
laws—from food inspection regulations to copyright, asylum, and drug laws, to 
Title VII’s protections against employment discrimination. 40  Similarly, the 
examples of artistic exemptions canvased throughout this part include a number 
of legislated carve outs for various artistic practices. 
 
 35. See supra note 23 (collecting explanations for protecting art under the First Amendment). 
 36. See Brian Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment in Law, 69 ALA. L. REV. 381, 387–412 (2017) (detailing 
ways in which the government subsidizes art in the United States) [hereinafter Soucek, Aesthetic 
Judgment]. 
 37. Some scholars have justified religious exemptions as a counterweight to the disadvantageous 
treatment of religion under the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses 
as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates: Why the Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and 
Establishment Clause Are Stronger when Both Clauses Are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1701, 
1703–04 (2011); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3 
(2000). According to these counterweight arguments, the state’s massive support for the arts should 
presumably weaken the justification for exempting art from the state’s laws. See CHRISTOPHER L. 
EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 51, 59–62 
(2007) (discussing why the United States funds and administers a National Endowment for the Arts 
but not a National Endowment for Religion); see also McConnell, supra, at 10 (noting that while General 
Motors and environmental activists do not get the same exemptions that religious practitioners 
sometimes do, General Motors—unlike religious organizations—can get bailed out by the government, 
and environmentalism—unlike religious beliefs—can be taught in schools and promoted through 
regulations that governmental agencies craft and enforce). 
 38. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4). 
 39. §6(a), 107 Stat. at 1489 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a)) (“This Act applies 
to all Federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and 
whether adopted before or after the enactment of this Act”). The Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified as amended 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to -5), requires more targeted exemptions from state laws in the contexts of 
prisons and land use.  
 40. See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic 
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445–46 (1992). 
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Technically, these statutory and regulatory schemes offer artistic 
exemptions within the law, not exemptions from the law. But laws like these 
remain relevant even to an Article concerned with art’s constitutional status for 
a few reasons. First, though artists obviously don’t need to claim an exemption 
from a law that already carves out their art, the original drafting of the law itself 
may have been a response to artistic exemption claims, including constitutional 
ones. 41  Second, when legislative carve outs are underinclusive—failing to 
include all that might qualify as art—those whose art is not exempted by the law 
will likely bring exemption claims against the law. 42  Third, and relatedly, 
legislative carve outs that provide exemptions for certain arts, but not others, 
can be challenged as discriminatory. 43 In such cases, legislative exemptions 
themselves are said to violate the Constitution’s protection for art. The 
following pages provide examples of all of this and more. 
A. Categorization Claims 
1.  Land Use 
Since 1990, Michael Kleinman has celebrated the opening of each of his 
novelty and gift stores with a charity “car bash.”44 Donors pay to smash a car 
with a sledgehammer, and after, the smashed car gets filled with dirt and plants, 
painted over by local artists, and displayed in front of the store.45 In November 
2007, this occurred in San Marcos, Texas.46 The victim: an Oldsmobile 88.47 
Unfortunately for Kleinman, San Marcos has a junked vehicle ordinance 
which says that inoperable vehicles that are wrecked or dismantled, lacking a 
license plate or inspection sticker, and visible from the street are treated as a 
public nuisance, subject to seizure and demolition.48 After a complaint was filed 
about a “nasty looking old vehicle” on the north side of the I-35, the city issued 
 
 41. See infra Section I.B.2 (discussing the New York City Council’s carve out for books and other 
printed material in its 1982 permit requirements for street vendors). 
 42. See infra Section I.A.3 (discussing claims by music clubs not granted a county tax exemption 
for admission revenue from “live performance[s] in any of the disciplines which are commonly regarded 
as part of the fine arts”). 
 43. See, e.g., Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695–96 (2d Cir. 1996) (considering but not 
deciding whether an ordinance that distinguishes between written and visual artistic expression 
discriminates on the basis of content); Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment, supra note 36, at 465–66 (discussing 
difficulties distinguishing content, viewpoint, speaker, and medium discrimination in regard to art). 
 44. Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 324 (5th Cir. 2010); Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 28, Kleinman, 597 F.3d 323 (No. 08-50960) [hereinafter Kleinman, Certiorari Petition]. 
 45. Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 324. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.; Kleinman, Certiorari Petition, supra note 44, at 59. 
 48. SAN MARCOS, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 34.191, 34.194, 34.200, 34.201(a) (LEXIS 
through Ordinance No. 2020-44, enacted June 16, 2020). 
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a citation, and a local court found that the object in front of Kleinman’s store 
qualified as a junked vehicle under San Marcos’s definition.49 
Kleinman’s counterargument was that the object in dispute was “no longer 
a vehicle of any kind, but ha[d] been fully recycled and transformed into a 
planter, and a work of art.”50 The transformation, in fact, was the very point of 
the artwork. 51  As Kleinman described his project: “I am trying to make a 
philosophical statement about the need to find ways to combat the pollution 
caused by automobiles, by finding ways to recycle and reprocess them, and this 
method does that, by showing how we can turn them into a beautiful work of 
art.”52 The car-planter artwork, in other words, exemplified the meaning that it 
was meant to convey.53 As the communication studies professor who served as 
Kleinman’s expert witness explained, “[T]he use of a junked car as an artistic 
and communicative medium . . . is a central part of the message that is 
communicated by the art object.” 54  In other words, “[T]he medium is the 
message.”55 
Kleinman lost this argument.56 Holding that the object on his lawn fit the 
definition of a junked vehicle, the court realized at least implicitly that the law 
cannot remain blind to the material out of which artworks are made.57 At best, 
the law can treat the regulated entity as both artwork and a mere thing—in this 
case, a junked car—at once. 
Here, however, Kleinman had a backup argument.58 In federal court, his 
claim was not that the local ordinance didn’t apply; rather, the ordinance, at 
least as applied to his junked-car art, was unconstitutional content 
discrimination.59 Since the medium was part of the message, regulation of the 
medium—junked cars—in his case interfered with the message he wanted to 
 
 49. Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 324–25; Brief of Appellants at 9, Kleinman, 597 F.3d 323 (No. 08-
50960). 
 50. Kleinman Affidavit, Record on Appeal at 47, Kleinman, 597 F.3d 323 (No. 08-50960). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 46. 
 53. Artworks that exemplify their meaning are ones that show, not (just) tell. More formally, they 
symbolically refer to properties which they themselves possess. Like samples or swatches, they call 
attention to (some of) their own properties. For a non-artistic example of this, compare the word 
“polysyllabic,” which exemplifies its meaning, with “monosyllabic,” which does not. For deep and at 
times amusing discussions of exemplification, see NELSON GOODMAN, LANGUAGES OF ART 52–67 
(1976), and NELSON GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING 32–37, 63–65 (1978). 
 54. Expert Report of Robert M. Bednar, Ph. D. at 2, Kleinman, 597 F.3d 323 (No. 08-50960). 
 55. Id. (quoting MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF 
MAN 7 (1964)). 
 56. See Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 325. 
 57. Id. See generally ARTHUR C. DANTO, THE TRANSFIGURATION OF THE COMMONPLACE: A 
PHILOSOPHY OF ART 1–32 (1981) (discussing the difference between “Works of Art and Mere Real 
Things”). 
 58. See Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 326. 
 59. Id. 
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convey. 60  But this argument too depended on a recategorization. Only by 
treating the regulated object as an artwork could medium and message merge 
in this way, such that regulating the former unconstitutionally abridged the 
latter. 
In an unsympathetic 2010 opinion,61 the Fifth Circuit rejected this move 
in Kleinman v. City of San Marcos. 62 It noted that the Supreme Court had 
referred to the “painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schönberg, or 
Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll” as “unquestionably shielded.”63 But this 
passage, it said, “refers solely to great works of art,” leaving open the question 
of whether lesser works should get protection at all.64 The expressive quality of 
Kleinman’s less exalted work was secondary to its function and utility, and thus 
regulations on its display were only subjected to rational basis review.65 Then, 
arguing in the alternative and acknowledging the possible expressive character 
of the work, the court applied the test established in United States v. O’Brien66 
for laws that incidentally burden expression.67 The O’Brien test asks whether a 
law furthers an important interest unrelated to expression, and whether it does 
so without incidentally burdening expression more than necessary to further the 
government’s interest.68 Finding no governmental intent to discriminate and 
plenty of alternative modes of expression available,69 the Fifth Circuit denied 
Kleinman his art exemption. The Supreme Court refused to take the case.70 
As we will repeatedly see in the examples to come, the First Amendment 
has particular difficulty dealing with claims like Kleinman’s: claims of 
exemplified meaning. Let’s say someone thought that the court system in this 
country was illegitimate and should be burned to the ground. One especially 
powerful way of communicating that message would be to literally burn a 
courthouse to the ground, and yet no court would recognize a First Amendment 
defense in that case.71 The problem is this: nearly any action can be understood 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. 597 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 63. Id. at 326 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 
557, 569 (1995)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 327 (claiming this holding could be made “without recourse to principles of aesthetics” 
(quoting Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 95 (2d Cir. 2006))); see also infra Section 
I.B.2. 
 66. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 67. Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 328. 
 68. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. For more on O’Brien, see infra notes 189–91. 
 69. See Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 328–29 (noting that Kleinman could display the work out of sight 
from the road or could display images of the work to those driving by). 
 70. 562 U.S. 837 (2010). 
 71. Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 772 (2001) (imagining 
a driver, arrested for speeding, who claims that driving fast was his way of “‘expressing disagreement’ 
with the federally mandated speed limit . . . [or] was ‘performance art’”). 
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as expressing endorsement of that very action. But that cannot bring every 
action within the protective coverage of the Free Speech Clause.72 And in a 
world where anything can be an artwork, 73  the First Amendment could 
potentially be invoked against any regulation at all.74 
This is the dynamic, and the worry, that was at play in Kleinman, where 
the defense’s main argument was a metaphysical one: this object is a work of 
art, not a junked car. It is easy to understand why the city issued a citation 
nonetheless. As the philosopher Arthur Danto once wrote: “To mistake an 
artwork for a real object is no great feat when an artwork is the real object one 
mistakes it for.”75 
2.  Threats and Lies 
Although Kleinman never got to the Supreme Court, another categorical 
art exemption claim did. It arose in a criminal threat case, Elonis v. United 
States.76 The Court dodged the First Amendment issue there, though,77 and in 
2019 it did so again by denying certiorari in a similar case, Commonwealth v. 
Knox.78 
Elonis and Knox both involved prosecutions against men accused of making 
threats in rap songs. Under his Facebook persona, Tone Dougie, Anthony 
Douglas Elonis posted rap lyrics describing violent acts against his ex-wife, local 
elementary schools, and an FBI agent.79 He was sentenced to three years and 
eight months for making threats in interstate commerce.80 Jamal Knox is a 
rapper whose work is commercially available under his stage name, Mayhem 
 
 72. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety 
of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to 
express an idea.”). 
 73. See, e.g., ARTHUR C. DANTO, WHAT ART IS 26 (2013) [hereinafter DANTO, WHAT ART IS] 
(“[J]ust because anything can be art, it doesn’t follow that everything is art.”); Amy M. Adler, The Folly 
of Defining Art, in THE NEW GATEKEEPERS: EMERGING CHALLENGES TO FREE EXPRESSION IN 
THE ARTS 90, 90 (Christopher Hawthorne & András Szántó eds., 2003). 
 74. Outside the context of art, a bourgeoning literature has arisen on what some see as the 
opportunistic expansiveness of recent First Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, 
First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 174, 
175 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002); Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The 
Voracious First Amendment: Alvarez and Knox in the Context of 2012 and Beyond, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
491, 491 (2013); Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199, 1200 
(2015); Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318, 318 (2018); Amanda 
Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 133 (2016). 
 75. Arthur Danto, The Artworld, 61 J. PHIL. 571, 575 (1964). 
 76. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
 77. Id. at 2013. 
 78. 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019). 
 79. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007. 
 80. Id. 
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Mal.81 After being arrested on drug and weapon charges, Knox posted a song 
online that described violence against the police officers who arrested him.82 
Charged with making terroristic threats and with witness intimidation, Knox 
was convicted and sentenced to a one-to-three year term.83 
Elonis and Knox both asked what it takes for a statement to count as a “true 
threat,” unprotected by the First Amendment. Courts are split: some look to 
subjective intent while others consider whether a reasonable person would hear 
in the speech an intent to cause harm.84 This isn’t a question limited to the arts, 
of course. Elonis himself was charged not just for his threatening rap lyrics but 
also for a comedy routine that he posted online.85 But both Elonis and Knox 
emphasized the artistic nature of their speech. 86  The petition for writ of 
certiorari in Knox, for example, claimed that the case was “of great concern to 
the music industry,” especially now, given that “many artists have directed 
virulent speech specifically toward the President.”87 Amicus briefs by music 
scholars and performers, including Killer Mike and Chance the Rapper, were 
filed in Knox’s support.88 And while the Supreme Court has left the issue open, 
addressing the intent requirement for criminal threats but not the claimed 
artistic exemptions, cases involving threats made within various genres of 
music89 and other arts90 have popped up across the country. 
 
 81. Knox, Certiorari Petition, supra note 29, at 3; see also ERIK NIELSON & ANDREA L. DENNIS, 
RAP ON TRIAL: RACE, LYRICS AND GUILT IN AMERICA 101–02, 106–11 (2019) (discussing Knox’s 
prosecution and appeal in the context of rap’s broader reception in American courts). 
 82. Knox, Certiorari Petition, supra note 29, at 4. 
 83. Id. at 6. 
 84. Id. at 7. 
 85. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005. 
 86. Knox, Certiorari Petition, supra note 29, at 19 (“Imprisoning a person for a statement that is 
not only objectively nonthreatening but in fact artistically or socially valuable is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the First Amendment and would erode the breathing space that safeguards the free 
exchange of ideas.”); see Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2006 (“Art is about pushing limits. I’m willing to go to 
jail for my Constitutional rights. Are you?”). 
 87. Knox, Certiorari Petition, supra note 29, at 23–24. 
 88. Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae and Brief of Amici Curiae Michael Render 
(“Killer Mike”) et al. in Support of Petitioner, Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2019), cert. 
denied sub nom. Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019) (No. 18-949), 2019 WL 1115837 
[hereinafter Knox, Brief of Render]; Motion for Leave to File and Brief for Amici Curiae Art Scholars 
and Historians in Support of Petitioner, Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (No. 19-949) [hereinafter Knox, Brief for 
Art Scholars]. 
 89. See Knox, 190 A.3d at 1146. 
 90. See, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 620 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding 
student’s sketch depicting violent siege on the school was protected speech); Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d 
824, 832 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that painted words on rear of van did not constitute true threats 
outside the scope of protection of the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee); LeVine v. Blaine 
Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that student’s poem implying a threat to himself 
and other students was not protected speech); In re George T., 93 P.3d 1007, 1009 (Cal. 2004) (holding 
that a violent poem disseminated by a juvenile was not a threat); In re Ryan D., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 
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The artistic exemption claims made in these cases can again be framed as 
miscategorization claims, much like Kleinman’s. In short: this is a rap lyric, not 
a threat. Like Kleinman, who thought an artwork had been misidentified as a 
junked car, the artist-defendants in the true threat cases also claimed that their 
speech had been put in the wrong categorical box. 
To that end, Knox’s petition for writ of certiorari argued that “reasonable 
listeners understand that violent lyrics in music are not literal.”91 His art scholar 
amici went further: 
[A] work of art is not the same thing as the messages it conveys or the 
feelings it arouses. A painting, poem, sculpture, or song may be 
consistent with reality, but that does not mean that it is reality. . . . Art 
does not manifest in the real; the thought-message of an artwork is 
experienced—sensed, felt, processed—not stated. See Archibald 
MacLeish, “Ars Poetica” (1926), (“A poem should not mean/But be.”).92 
The scholars draw a line here between musical lyrics and ordinary, literal 
expression—between art and reality. The prosecutors and jury erred in Knox’s 
case, they argue, by confusing the former for the latter. 
It is not entirely clear how art’s failure to manifest in the real coheres with 
the art scholars’ discussions of art therapy and catharsis, both of which turn on 
art’s efficacy in altering the presumably real emotions of those who experience 
it. 93  The categorical claim turns on the not fully coherent idea that art is 
metaphysically separate from the world of everyday threats. 
A similar categorical exemption claim can be found in cases involving 
constitutional protection for lies and exaggerations. Before it was struck down 
in 2012, the Stolen Valor Act94 made it a crime to claim falsely that one had 
been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.95 “The Act by its plain terms 
applies to a false statement made at any time, in any place, to any person,” 
Justice Kennedy wrote for a four-member plurality 96  in United States v. 
 
195 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a painting depicting a minor shooting a high school police 
officer was not a threat). 
 91. Knox, Certiorari Petition, supra note 29, at 25. 
 92. Knox, Brief for Art Scholars, supra note 88, at 8 (citations omitted or shortened); see also id. at 
12 (“[T]he fact that rap roots itself firmly in the real does not make it any less representational (or any 
more real) than other forms of violent artistic expression that are entitled to First Amendment 
protection.”). 
 93. Nor is it clear how the modernism typified by the authority the scholars cite, Archibald 
MacLeish’s “Ars Poetica,” is consistent with the politically engaged conception of hip-hop and rap that 
the amicus brief goes on to describe. For a reevaluation of MacLeish as a politically engaged poet whose 
later work stands opposed to the high modernism of his more famous poems like “Ars Poetica,” see 
John Timberman Newcomb, Archibald MacLeish and the Poetics of Public Speech: A Critique of High 
Modernism, 23 J. MIDWEST MOD. LANGUAGE ASS’N 9, 9 (1990). 
 94. 18 U.S.C. § 704(c)(1). 
 95. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012). 
 96. Id. at 722. 
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Alvarez.97 Even so, he added one crucial qualification: “It can be assumed that 
[the Act] would not apply to, say, a theatrical performance.”98 
The theater exemption Justice Kennedy read into the Stolen Valor Act is 
nowhere in the text. So how is it justified? Are statements made in theater not 
falsehoods, since they are true within the world of the play? Perhaps the 
categorical claim is that the Stolen Valor Act criminalized liars, not actors. 
It would be much too strong, however, to say that statements cannot be 
lies—or for that matter, threats—because they occur within a play. Consider 
Hamlet.99 Not only are lies told within the world of that play,100 but Hamlet’s 
plot turns on the fact that a play can be used to cause real effects—even make 
threats!—within the non-make-believe world. Though Hamlet himself says that 
the players in his staging of The Murder of Gonzago “do but jest, poison in jest; 
no offense i’ the world,” the very point of the staging is to cause offense and 
fear in Hamlet and Claudius’s world, not that of Gonzago onstage. 101 King 
Claudius should feel no less threatened by the fact that he’s merely watching 
theater. 
In Alvarez, Justice Kennedy suggests a different argument for why lies 
about congressional medals in plays might be treated differently. Instead of 
relying on metaphysical claims about theater, or art more generally, Kennedy 
refers to a line of defamation and emotional distress cases102 where the Court 
found that the hyperbolic or parodic statements at issue could not “reasonably 
be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual.”103 Key here is the 
notion of “interpretation.” Knowing we are in a theater is less a metaphysical 
insight than it is an interpretive fact. It is one of many context clues, none 
necessarily dispositive, that may lead us to interpret a statement as literal, 
deceptive, or threatening—or not. 
A similar question of interpretation emerges when we turn back to the rap 
cases. The artistic medium (music) and the genre (rap) that were employed by 
Elonis, Knox, and others can be seen as interpretively relevant, even if not 
metaphysically so. That is to say, the fact that some statement was made within 
a rap song is surely relevant in determining whether the statement was meant 
to be, or is properly understood as, threatening. But this is far different than 
 
 97. 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
 98. Id. 
 99. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET (Edward Dowden ed., London, Methuen & Co. 1899). 
 100. As Hamlet accuses the grave-digging clown in Act V: “Thou dost lie in’t, to be in’t and say it 
is thine; ‘tis for the dead, not for the quick; therefore thou liest.” Id. at act V, sc. 1. 
 101. See id. at act III, sc. 2. 
 102. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 722 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990)). The 
Court in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), in turn, cites Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988), National Ass’n Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284–86 (1974), 
and Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970). Mikovich, 497 U.S. at 20. 
 103. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 722 (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20). 
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saying, as amici did, that rap lyrics are metaphysically incapable of 
communicating true threats. Arguing that a statement “was (just) rap” is 
perhaps best seen not as a categorical defense but rather as a weight put on the 
interpretive scale. I return to this point in Part III.104 
For now, it is important to note that even in regard to interpretation, 
identifying a rap song or play as art plays no role. What matters for deciding 
whether something is a threat or lie is the context provided by the conventions 
of a given medium, like theater, or of a genre, like rap. As Part II argues, the 
category “art” does not itself have its own interpretive conventions. So arthood 
does no interpretive work here at all. 
3.  Taxes 
New York state taxes admission fees for “place[s] of amusement” unless 
they are a “theatre, opera house, concert hall or other hall or place of assembly 
for a live dramatic, choreographic or musical performance.”105 Nite Moves, a 
strip club outside Albany, spent years arguing that the pole and lap dancing it 
offers constitute “choreographic . . . performance.” 106  In 2012, New York’s 
highest court disagreed, finding that the state’s Tax Appeal Tribunal need not 
“extend a tax exemption to every act that declares itself a ‘dance 
performance.’”107 Three judges dissented, accusing the majority of “mak[ing] a 
distinction between highbrow dance and lowbrow dance that is not to be found 
in the governing statute and raises significant constitutional problems.” 108 
“Under New York’s Tax Law,” said the dissenters, “a dance is a dance.”109 
In Chicago, similar city and county taxes applied to amusements other 
than “live performance[s] in any of the disciplines which are commonly 
regarded as part of the fine arts, such as live theater, music, opera, drama, 
comedy, ballet, modern or traditional dance, and book or poetry readings.”110 In 
2016, county officials went after music venues for hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in unpaid taxes, and a hearing officer agreed that “[r]ap music, country 
music, and rock ‘n’ roll do not fall under the purview of ‘fine art.’”111 Eventually, 
 
 104. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 105. N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 1101(d)(5), 1105(f)(1) (Westlaw through L.2021, chs. 1 to 49, 61 to 68). 
 106. 677 New Loudon Corp. v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 85 A.D.3d 1341, 1341–43 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2011), aff’d, 19 N.Y.3d 1058 (2012). 
 107. Id. 
 108. 677 New Loudon Corp. v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 19 N.Y.3d 1058, 1061 (2012) (Smith, 
J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. at 1062. 
 110. COOK COUNTY, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 74-391 (LEXIS through Ordinance No. 20-
4356, enacted October 22, 2020); id. § 74-392(a); cf. id. § 74-392(d)(1) (offering tax exemptions to 
venues that seat 750 or fewer people). 
 111. Lee V. Gaines, Cook County Doubles Down: Rap, Rock, Country, and DJ Sets Are Not ‘Fine Arts,’ 
Not Exempt from Amusement Tax, CHI. READER (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.chicagoreader.com/ 
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the county ended up amending its ordinances to clarify what kinds of DJ sets 
qualified for the exemption, but litigation over back taxes continued until the 
parties settled.112 These kinds of taxes, with exemptions that privilege certain 
art forms over others, have long been common at the local, state, and even 
federal level.113 The federal cabaret tax—which got as high as thirty percent 
during World War II, but didn’t apply to instrumental music in venues without 
dancing—likely sped the decline of big band jazz (which was taxed) and the 
growth of bebop (which was not).114 
The art exemption claims made in the tax cases are categorization claims: 
they turn on the argument that some activity being taxed as entertainment is 
really tax-exempt art. These cases are different from those of the preceding 
sections, however, in three interesting ways. 
First, these claims seek to benefit from an exemption already enshrined in 
a statute. The strip club wants the exemption New York City Ballet already 
gets;115 the rock club wants to be treated the same way Chicago treats its classical 
recital halls.116 Here, then, we encounter the first artistic analogue to the many 
statutory carve outs that exempt religious believers or organizations from 
otherwise applicable legal requirements, from the military draft117 to Title VII’s 
protection against religious discrimination.118 As in those cases, the statutory 
exemption spawns two types of controversies. One is definitional: What is a 
religious organization? Or similarly: What counts as a choreographic 
performance? The other concerns unconstitutional favoritism: Why let religious 
believers but not secular pacifists out of the draft? Why should ballet get a 
government benefit pole dancing does not? 
 
Bleader/archives/2016/08/22/cook-county-doubles-down-rap-rock-country-and-dj-sets-are-not-fine-
arts-not-exempt-from-amusement-tax [https://perma.cc/XKE3-DTRT]; Whet Moser, This Is What 
Happens when Courts Decide What Is and Isn’t Art, CHI. MAG. (Aug. 25, 2016), 
https://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/August-2016/Cook-County-Fine-Arts/ [https://perma.cc/ 
SF6E-4XKD]. 
 112. Settlement Agreement Between Cook County and Wladyslaw Kowynia, Inc., Cook Cnty. 
Dep’t of Revenue v. Wladyslaw Kowynia, Inc., No. D15050079 (Cook Cty. Dep’t of Admin. Hearings 
Mar. 31, 2017) (settled).  
 113. See, e.g., Carpenteri-Waddington, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue Servs., 650 A.2d 147, 152–53 
(Conn. 1994) (describing the federal cabaret tax, first imposed during World War I). The tax applied 
to “vaudeville or other performance or diversion in the way of acting, singing, declamation or dancing, 
either with or without instrumental or other music” but exempted “orchestras performing instrumental 
music only.” Id. at 152. 
 114. Patrick Jarenwattananon, How Taxes and Moving Changed the Sound of Jazz, NPR (Apr. 16, 
2013, 4:27 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/ablogsupreme/2013/04/16/177486309/how-taxes-and-
moving-changed-the-sound-of-jazz?ft=1 [https://perma.cc/JB2F-VZCK]. 
 115. See 677 New Loudon Corp. v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 19 N.Y.3d 1058, 1059 (2012). 
 116. See Gaines, supra note 111. 
 117. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
 118. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327 (1987). 
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The former, definitional questions may give rise to some difficult statutory 
interpretation problems, but these can all be resolved, at least in theory, by more 
precise legislative drafting. West Virginia law, for example, avoids the problem 
that arose in New York by explicitly barring “nude or strip show presentations” 
from the tax exemption the state offers other “dance presentation[s].”119 More 
intractable is the second constitutional worry that arises when one art form is 
treated less favorably than another. 
But this is where another difference between these tax cases and the cases 
in the preceding subsections comes in. The artistic exemption claims in the 
earlier cases were all trying to skirt some government prohibition. Without an 
exemption, Kleinman’s junked car got ticketed; Elonis and Knox served prison 
sentences for their rap. By contrast, Nite Moves and the bars in Chicago are 
not getting shut down; they’re being made to pay the same taxes that venues 
presenting ice dancing or the circus also have to pay. At stake in these tax cases, 
at least arguably, is something more akin to a government subsidy.120 
The framing here matters from a constitutional standpoint. If Nite Moves 
is being penalized by a selective tax, the worries about content discrimination 
that arose in the junked car case return in an even more pointed way.121 If, 
however, Nite Moves and the bars in Chicago are just missing out on a subsidy 
offered to others, this seems no more constitutionally problematic than 
government arts funding itself.122 
There is one final difference: tax cases make explicit the kinds of value 
judgments about art that remained largely under the surface in the earlier 
subsections. According to the dissenting judges in New York, the strip club was 
taxed “because [its] performances are, in the majority’s view, not ‘cultural and 
artistic.’”123 In Chicago, the hearing officer wanted musicologists to come testify 
about why “the music [the clubs] are talking about falls within any disciplines 
considered fine art.”124 The definitional or category questions in the tax cases 
 
 119. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-15-9(a)(40) (LEXIS through all 2020 Reg. Sess. Legislation). 
 120. See Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment, supra note 36, at 459–61. In fact, the government “subsidy” 
provided to U.S. arts organizations through their tax-exempt status amounts to billions of dollars—as 
much or more than the direct support the government provides through grant programs. Id. at 396 
n.73. 
 121. See 677 New Loudon Corp. v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 19 N.Y.3d 1058, 1063 (2012) 
(Smith, J., dissenting) (imagining, and finding unconstitutional, a state tax imposed on Hustler 
magazine but not The New Yorker); cf. Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 (1987) 
(striking down Arkansas’s “selective, content-based taxation of certain magazines”). 
 122. See Ark. Writers’ Project, 481 U.S. at 236 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Regan v. Taxation With 
Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 545–46 (1983); see also Brian Soucek, Discriminatory 
Paycheck Protection, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 319, 326–30 (2020) (distinguishing selective 
government subsidies from discriminatory regulation on speech); Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment, supra note 
36, at 459–66 (discussing difficulties with this distinction). 
 123. 677 New Loudon Corp., 19 N.Y.3d at 1062 (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1060 (majority 
opinion)). 
 124. Moser, supra note 111. 
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were thus being argued at least partially on evaluative grounds. Not just “Is this 
dance or music?” but “Is this dance or music good enough for the state to 
subsidize?” Perhaps the courts or administrative hearing officers have no 
business asking these questions, but insofar as the tax “exemptions” are akin to 
subsidies, legislators can surely decide what arts activities are worthy of state 
support. 
To give a subsidy—a tax exemption—only to art making deemed worthy 
requires evaluation and, ultimately, balancing of various governmental 
interests.125 Courts don’t always acknowledge that. They treat evaluation as if it 
were classification, categorizing less favored arts as “entertainment” or denying 
that the dancing in a strip bar is a “choreographic performance.”126 We will 
return to this point after looking at claims where the balancing is explicit. 
B. Balancing Claims 
The above categorization claims argue that a law has been misapplied, 
having confused art with something else—junked cars, threats, lies, or mere 
entertainment.127 By contrast, balancing claims acknowledge the applicability of 
a law but argue that art’s expressive value trumps whatever value the law aims 
to promote, whether that be privacy, personal autonomy, equality, economic 
fairness, or sidewalk congestion. 
1.  Privacy and Trademark 
When the photographer Arne Svenson exhibited his project, The 
Neighbors, at New York’s Julie Saul Gallery in 2013, his neighbors were incensed 
to learn that they were, in fact, the subject of the show.128 Over the course of a 
year, Svenson had taken their photographs from his Tribeca studio with a 
telephoto lens aimed at their windowed apartments across the street.129 
New York privacy law prohibits using someone’s “name, portrait, picture 
or voice . . . for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without [their] 
written consent.”130 But when Svenson’s neighbors sued him for selling pictures 
 
 125. See, e.g., Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment, supra note 36, at 414–16 (discussing a similar balancing of 
interests in land use decisions). 
 126. See supra notes 105–14 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra Sections I.A.2–3. 
 128. Hili Perlson, Voyeuristic Photographer Arne Svenson Wins New York Appellate Court Case, 
ARTNET (Apr. 10, 2015), https://news.artnet.com/market/arne-svenson-neighbors-photographs-
supreme-court-286916 [https://perma.cc/VXU6-74P7]. 
 129. Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150, 152–53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). 
 130. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (Westlaw through L.2021, ch. 1 to 49, 61 to 68). Unlike other 
states, New York does not recognize a right to privacy tort based on “unreasonable intrusion upon 
seclusion.” See Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 123–24 (1993). It is hard to imagine Svenson 
succeeding in his art exemption claim against that tort, were it available. 
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of them, they lost.131 State courts in New York decided that “works of art fall 
outside the prohibition of the privacy statute.”132 Just as courts had previously 
exempted “newsworthy events and matters of public concern” from New York’s 
privacy statute, the appellate court in Foster v. Svenson133 found “that the public, 
as a whole, has an equally strong interest in the dissemination of images, 
aesthetic values and symbols contained in the art work,” as well as “the 
informational value of the ideas conveyed by the art work.”134 
The reasoning in Svenson’s case is not entirely clear.135 Is Svenson’s art 
exempt because it “fall[s] outside” the terms of the statute—perhaps because art 
is thought to be something other than a “trade” good? 136 That would be a 
categorization claim: use in art and use “for the purposes of trade” are different 
things. Other New York courts had previously taken that approach with 
sculpture, for example. Distinguishing the protected work of a sculptor who 
wanted to make ten bronzes of model Cheryl Tiegs’s face from the unprotected 
work of a commercial “manikin” manufacturer, a state court found in Simeonov 
v. Tiegs 137  that the sculptor “is an artist who created a work of art”—a 
“distinctive manner of human expression”—whereas “the manufacturer and 
seller of the large number of manikins” “clearly was acting ‘for purposes of 
trade.’”138 
The second half of the Svenson quotation suggests a different line of 
reasoning, however: perhaps art’s “aesthetic” and “informational value” to the 
public is more important than the privacy concerns of the individuals whose 
images were used and sold. This is a balancing approach, and it too draws on 
earlier cases from courts in New York. One federal decision, prompted by a 
Barbara Kruger collage, rejected categorizing, which it said “invites judges to 
decide what constitutes art or expression—and what does not—thus asking 
them to . . . draw potentially artificial lines.”139 Instead, the court determined 
 
 131. Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 163. 
 132. Id. at 158; see also id. at 159 (“In our view, artistic expression in the form of art work must 
therefore be given the same leeway extended to the press under the newsworthy and public concern 
exemption to the statutory tort of invasion of privacy.”). 
 133. 128 A.D.3d 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). 
 134. Id. at 156, 158–59. See generally Robert C. Post & Jennifer E. Rothman, The First Amendment 
and the Right(s) of Publicity, 130 YALE L.J. 86, 158 n.311 (2020) (citing and discussing numerous court 
decisions that either allowed or rejected exceptions from liability for artworks).  
 135. Robert Post and Jennifer Rothman’s important discussion of right of publicity cases finds 
constitutionally salient distinctions among public discourse, commercial speech, and commodities. See 
Post & Rothman, supra note 134, at 141–46, 156–62. For them, the level of First Amendment protection 
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 136. See id. at 158–59. 
 137. 159 Misc. 2d 54 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1993). 
 138. Id. at 55–56, 58–59. 
 139. Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 340, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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the reach of New York’s privacy law by carrying out “a careful weighing of 
interests, on a case-by-case basis.”140 
In doing so, the Hoepker v. Kruger141 court looked beyond New York to the 
California supreme court’s well-known transformative use test—another self-
described “balancing test between the First Amendment and the right of 
publicity.”142 Borrowing from the fair use test in copyright,143 the California 
supreme court held in Comedy III Productions v. Saderup144 that “when a work 
contains significant transformative elements, it is not only especially worthy of 
First Amendment protection, but it is also less likely to interfere with the 
economic interest protected by the right of publicity.”145 The court cautioned 
that artistic quality is irrelevant; what matters is “whether the literal and 
imitative or the creative elements predominate in the work.” 146  The more 
creative the transformation, the heavier the First Amendment interests will 
weigh in the balance against the economic concerns on the other side of the 
scale.147 Back in New York, the Hoepker court later summed up the test as asking 
“whether it is the art, or the celebrity, that is being sold or displayed” when a 
work of art includes a celebrity’s image.148 
A freewheeling balancing test like this may have more unpredictable 
results149 compared to a categorical rule that “any work of art, however much it 
trespasses on the right of publicity and however much it lacks additional 
creative elements, is categorically shielded from liability by the First 
Amendment.”150 But then again, it may not, as the categorical rule just shifts 
the fight from what is sufficiently transformative to what is art. Part II will have 
more to say about why that particular shift is unhelpful: even if the results 
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 150. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 809 n.11. 
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happen to be more predictable—an open question—they are based on 
considerations that do little to explain why some people, namely artists, should 
get exemptions that other transformative creators and speakers lack.151 
The California supreme court’s test is not the only balancing test on 
offer. 152  A prominent alternative comes from the Second Circuit, whose 
decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi153 allowed the use of a celebrity’s name in a movie 
title unless it was “wholly unrelated to the movie” or was just a “disguised 
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.” 154 In the suit, 
Ginger Rogers brought both right of publicity and false advertising claims after 
Fellini used “Ginger and Fred” as the title of a film.155 
Focusing on the Lanham Act’s156 prohibition on false advertising,157 the 
Second Circuit rejected the categorical approach taken by the lower court, 
which had refused to apply the Lanham Act to film titles at all since they were 
said to be “within the realm of artistic expression” rather than serving “a 
commercial purpose.”158 “Movies, plays, books, and songs,” the Second Circuit 
countered, are still “sold in the commercial marketplace like other more 
utilitarian products.”159 It makes little sense, then, to categorically exempt them 
from false advertising law. “The purchaser of a book, like the purchaser of a can 
of peas, has a right not to be misled as to the source of the product.”160 
What is required instead is balancing: “only where the public interest in 
avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression” 
does the Lanham Act apply.161 A violation could occur either if the title has no 
relevance to the work or if it explicitly misleads about the work’s source or 
content.162 
Even though a work’s arthood does not immunize it from a Lanham Act 
challenge, the Rogers court did still seem to make arthood relevant to its 
balancing test. Consumers of art, after all, don’t rely on titles the same ways 
 
 151. See infra Section II.C. 
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they may rely on the label on a can of peas: “[M]ost consumers are well aware 
that they cannot judge a book solely by its title any more than by its cover.”163 
This suggests an important difference between the balancing in cases like 
Rogers versus that which may have been used in privacy/publicity cases like 
Svenson: a work’s status as art seems to affect both sides of the balance in the 
former but not the latter. Consumers are less likely to be led astray by 
ambiguous or suggestive titles than they are by unclear or misleading product 
labels; avoiding consumer confusion—the public interest opposed to the First 
Amendment interests of the artist—is thus lessened by the fact that the product 
is an artwork. Not so in the Svenson case: the fact that his images of his 
neighbors are artworks does nothing to lessen their privacy concerns. If arthood 
matters at all to the balancing in Svenson, it is only on the side of the artist, not 
on both sides, as in Rogers. 
The fact that the Rogers court talks in terms of artworks and their titles is 
actually misleading, however. In fact, its test is not limited either to art or to 
titles. For one thing, the holding applies to all titled works, not just to artworks. 
Were the title of a law review article to include a celebrity’s name, the Rogers 
test would still apply. The operative distinction is between labeled products and 
titled works, and the set of titled things extends far beyond artworks. For 
another thing, courts have used the Rogers test in cases where the content rather 
than the title of works is what was said to mislead. Use of Tiger Woods’s 
image,164 a painting of the University of Alabama’s football uniforms,165 the 
well-known cover design of Cliffs Notes in a parody book166—all have been 
given the benefit of the speech-protective balancing test established in Rogers. 
As a test that establishes the bounds of privacy, publicity, false advertising, and 
trademark claims, Rogers balancing isn’t confined either to the category of titles 
or the category of art. 
2.  Street Vending 
New York City requires street vendors to have a permit, and the number 
of permits has been capped at 853 for over forty years.167 There have long been 
exceptions, though: honorably discharged veterans are protected under state 
law, and vendors of newspapers, magazines, and similar written matter have 
been exempted since 1982.168 (The City wrote these exemptions into the law as 
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a response to First Amendment worries.)169 In the Giuliani era, with arrests on 
the rise, 170 a group of painters, sculptors, and photographers challenged the 
city’s regulations. As the district court described their claim: “Plaintiffs . . . take 
the position that all works of fine art are forms of expression which fall under 
the First Amendment’s protection of ‘speech.’”171 The artists didn’t deny that 
their artworks were subject to the terms of New York City’s general vendors’ 
law. Rather, they argued that the expressive value of “fine art” categorically 
outweighs the concerns about sidewalk congestion that motived the New York 
City Council to enact the vendors law in the first place.172 
When the artists’ case reached the Second Circuit as Bery v. City of New 
York,173 the appellate court took a more fine-grained approach to what categories 
it put on the balancing scales. It began by distinguishing “the crafts of the 
jeweler, the potter and the silversmith”—whose work it described as only 
sometimes expressive—from “paintings, photographs, prints and sculptures,” 
which it said “always communicate some idea or concept to those who view 
it.”174 Having thus categorized, the court then proceeded to balance: New York 
City, it found, had done nothing to show that its interests in reducing 
congestion justified the expressive burden it imposed.175 Along the way, the 
court accepted the artists’ argument that alternative venues—private galleries, 
for example—either weren’t available or were insufficient, since selling on the 
street was itself part of the artists’ “expressive purpose.”176 The artists received 
their exemption.177 
In granting its medium-specific exemptions, the Bery court never explicitly 
said that artists working in other mediums did not merit an exemption. That 
task was left for a second case, Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York,178 brought a 
 
 169. See Bery, 97 F.3d at 692. 
 170. David R. Francis, What Reduced Crime in New York City, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RSCH. 
DIG., Jan. 2003, at 2, 2–3, https://www.nber.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/jan03.PDF [https:// 
perma.cc/PL8C-46RX]. 
 171. Bery v. City of New York, 906 F. Supp. 163, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 172. Cf. Bery, 97 F.3d at 697 (striking the balance in the artists’ favor, noting that the city had 
pointed “to nothing on this record concerning its need to ensure street safety and lack of congestion 
that would justify the imposition of the instant prohibitive interdiction barring the display and sale of 
visual art on the City streets”). 
 173. 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 174. Id. at 696. 
 175. Id. at 697. 
 176. Id. at 698. 
 177. Id. at 699. In a surprising turn of events that ended up being hugely consequential for New 
York City sidewalks, the consent decree the city ultimately reached with the plaintiffs after the remand 
in Bery provided a dramatically larger art exemption than the one originally requested. Bery v. City of 
New York, No. 94-CIV-4253, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1997) (order granting permanent injunction). 
Whereas the Second Circuit had affirmed a First Amendment right for painters, sculptors, printmakers, 
and photographers to sell their work on city sidewalks, the consent decree allowed anyone to sell 
paintings, sculpture, prints, and photographs without a permit. Id. 
 178. 435 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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decade later by two artists who made and wanted to sell “clothing painted with 
graffiti.”179 Although the Second Circuit determined that their clothing had a 
“predominantly expressive purpose,”180 it did not accept the artists’ claim that 
their works were paintings, thereby governed by the Bery decree. “The term 
‘paintings,’” it held, “does not include baseball caps, jackets, and other articles 
of clothing that have been artistically decorated with paints and markers.”181 
Thus, the Second Circuit categorized the graffiti artists’ painted clothing in a 
middle-ground: expressive, thus not mere merchandise, but not painting, one 
of the mediums of expression recognized in Bery. 
The balancing test it then used was notably more deferential to the city 
than the one applied in Bery. The vendor permit restriction should be upheld, 
the court said, as long as the government’s interests “would be achieved less 
effectively absent the regulation.”182 This is a hard test for the government to lose, 
unless it acts gratuitously. 183  Here, any broadened exemption would surely 
increase the number of vendors and cause at least some marginal increase in 
sidewalk congestion. 
The licensing requirement that was struck down as insufficiently tailored 
when applied to painting, prints, photographs, and sculpture in Bery was found 
to be narrowly tailored and upheld when applied to the goods in Mastrovincenzo. 
The different outcomes had four causes: (1) the Mastrovincenzo plaintiffs, unlike 
those in Bery, never claimed that selling on the street was part of their works’ 
meaning; (2) by talking up their artistic bona fides, the Mastrovincenzo plaintiffs 
undermined their argument that other venues, like galleries, were unavailable 
to them; (3) the Mastrovincenzo court expected that line drawing problems 
would be greater for “policemen on the beat”184 when art is made out of t-shirts 
and hats rather than the “more-easily-classified” mediums protected in Bery;185 
and finally; (4) Bery and Mastrovincenzo applied different balancing tests: a more 
stringent one for traditional mediums of expression and another, more lenient 
one, for “less orthodox modes of communication.”186 
The different balancing tests employed in Bery versus Mastrovincenzo are 
exactly what John Hart Ely predicted in his 1975 essay, Flag Desecration: A Case 
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis.187 
 
 179. Id. at 82. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 103. 
 182. Id. at 98 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989)). 
 183. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in 
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1485 (1975); see also id. at 1486 (“[L]egislatures 
simply do not enact wholly useless provisions.”). 
 184. Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 95. 
 185. Id. at 102. 
 186. Ely, supra note 183, at 1488. 
 187. See id. 
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Ely noted that the test offered in O’Brien—which, as we have seen,188 pits the 
government’s non-speech-related reasons for regulating against the regulation’s 
incidental burdens on expression189—can be understood in two different ways. 
Courts can uphold regulatory burdens as “no greater than essential” either 
because (1) alternative regulations would serve the government’s interest less 
effectively; 190  or (2) the marginal difference in effectiveness between a 
regulation and its alternatives outweighs the burden on communication.191 Ely 
argued that the Supreme Court has unconsciously chosen to reserve the second, 
more speech-protective mode of balancing “for relatively familiar or traditional 
means of expression, such a pamphlets, pickets, public speeches and rallies . . . 
and to relegate other, less orthodox modes of communication to the weak, nay 
useless, ‘no gratuitous inhibition’ approach.”192 
More recently, Robert Post has similarly highlighted the significance of 
what he calls “First Amendment media.”193 According to Post, two independent 
considerations can or should trigger First Amendment scrutiny: (1) the nature 
of the governmental interests served by a regulation, and (2) “whether the 
regulation . . . seeks to restrict a recognized medium for the communication of 
ideas.”194 The two relevant questions, in other words, are: “Why does the state 
regulate?” and “What does it regulate?” 195 The latter question looks not to 
individual acts of expression, but to the medium through which the expression 
occurs. As Post writes: “The very concept of a medium presupposes that 
constitutionally protected expression does not inhere in abstract and 
disembodied acts of communication . . . but is instead always conveyed through 
social and material forms of interaction.”196 Surprisingly few other authors have 
 
 188. See supra Section I.A.1. 
 189. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 190. Ely, supra note 183, at 1484–85. This is the version of the balancing test applied in O’Brien 
itself. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377–78. 
 191. See id. at 1486–87. Ely offers the example of anti-handbill ordinances: banning them would 
decrease litter, but the cost to expression would outweigh the benefit. 
 192. Id. at 1488–89; see also id. at 1490 (“[I]t seems likely that the Court will continue, either 
explicitly or implicitly, to distinguish between familiar and unorthodox modes of communication in 
deciding whether genuinely to balance in evaluating less restrictive alternatives or rather simply assure 
itself, as it will always be able to, that no gratuitous inhibition of expression has been effected.”). 
 193. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1253 (1995) 
[hereinafter Post, Recuperating]. 
 194. Id. at 1255–56. 
 195. Id. at 1255. 
 196. Id. at 1257; see also Post & Rothman, supra note 134, at 137, 159–60 (noting that the 
“boundaries of . . . categories [are] anything but obvious” and, consequently, courts struggle to 
determine what gets First Amendment protection). 
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given sustained attention to the role mediums of expression play in the Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment doctrine.197 
Mastrovincenzo hints at both the dangers and the benefits of using 
mediums of expression to determine the strength of the First Amendment 
balancing test that courts apply. On the downside, reliance on traditional 
mediums of expression is inherently conservative; almost by definition, it favors 
that which is traditional. 198 We see that in Bery and Mastrovincenzo: canvas 
painting receives protection that graffiti art does not.199 But Mastrovincenzo also 
shows an upside of treating different mediums differently. Attending to 
mediums allows courts to notice that regulatory needs may vary from one 
medium to another. In Mastrovincenzo, the court worried that police would have 
a harder time distinguishing expressive from nonexpressive painted t-shirts 
than they would have distinguishing paintings, prints, photographs, and 
sculptures from other types of merchandise. This made exemptions more costly 
in Mastrovincenzo compared to Bery, and it helped justify the different results 
in those two cases. 
The lesson is that traditional mediums may be easier to distinguish than 
newer modes of expression—or borderline instances of the old modes; this 
makes it easier to grant them exemptions without sliding down slippery slopes. 
The question, to which we will return in Parts II and III,200 is whether certain 
mediums of expression can be picked out and privileged for reasons germane to 
law or whether judges will simply favor the mediums they, and people like 
them,201 know and enjoy. 
Questions like these become especially consequential when less traditional 
forms of expression are pitted against laws promoting equality. 
 
 197. See infra Section III.A. For a recent and particularly sensitive discussion of mediums offered 
for another purpose entirely, see Joseph Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J. 308, 324–31 (2019); See also Ryan 
S. Bezerra, What Dalzell Saw: Medium-Specific Analysis Under the First Amendment, 17 GLENDALE L. 
REV. 1, 4 (1999) (“This Paper explores how the Court analyzes First Amendment cases by focusing on 
how the government regulation at issue flows from or affects the underlying technology or physical 
characteristics of the impacted medium of expression and how this mode of analysis is consistent with 
the most widely accepted theory of the purpose of the First Amendment.”). 
 198. Cf. Ely, supra note 183, at 1489 (expressing the worry that “only orthodox modes of expression 
will be protected”). 
 199. See Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 104 (2d Cir. 2006) (“‘[P]aintings,’ as 
it is . . . used and understood in common parlance, refers not to all goods that are ‘painted’ but only 
and specifically to painted canvases.”). While graffiti might constitute its own medium of expression, 
in Mastrovincenzo itself it was perhaps being used more as a style rather than a medium. 
 200. See infra notes Sections II.C, III.B.1. 
 201. See generally Danielle Root, Jake Faleschini & Grace Oyenubi, Building a More Inclusive Federal 
Judiciary, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 3, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/courts/reports/2019/10/03/475359/building-inclusive-federal-judiciary/ [https://perma.cc/N59X 
-Z7EU] (describing the federal judiciary’s lack of diversity in regard to race, gender, sexual orientation, 
religion, and educational and employment background). 
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3.  Antidiscrimination Law 
The case that made it to the Supreme Court as Masterpiece Cakeshop v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission202 began in 2012 when Charlie Craig and Dave 
Mullins were planning a reception to celebrate their wedding.203 Needing a 
cake, they visited Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, Colorado.204 
Masterpiece Cakeshop qualifies as a public accommodation under 
Colorado state law, so it has to provide customers the “equal enjoyment of [its] 
goods” without discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.205 The store’s 
owner, Jack Phillips, argued that this violated his Free Speech and Free Exercise 
rights by “compelling him to exercise his artistic talents to express a message 
with which he disagreed,”206 by forcing him to participate “in celebrating what 
he regards as a religious event,”207 and by treating religious opponents of same-
sex marriage (like Phillips) differently than those who support it.208 
The first of these arguments was emphatically framed as an artistic 
exemption claim. And as such, it was clearly a balancing, not a categorizing one. 
No one disputed the fact that Phillips’s cakes were goods sold to the public, 
subject to Colorado’s public accommodations law. Phillips’s claim was rather 
that his “artistic freedom” or “artistic voice”209 was more important than Craig 
and Mullins’ freedom from discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
Phillips’s art exemption claim didn’t prevail, although he did: seven 
Justices found in his favor on Free Exercise grounds.210 Only Justice Thomas, 
joined by Justice Gorsuch, discussed Phillips’s claimed artistic exemption. 
Justice Thomas noted that “Phillips considers himself an artist,” his business 
logo includes “an artist’s paint palette,” and Phillips’s shop “has a picture that 
depicts him as an artist painting on a canvas.” 211  Further, “Phillips takes 
exceptional care with each cake that he creates.”212 All of this was marshalled as 
evidence that his conduct was expressive. The majority, meanwhile, bypassed 
talk of art entirely, noting only that differences between cakes decorated with 
 
 202. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 203. Id. at 1724. 
 204. Id. 
 205. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (LEXIS through all laws passed during the 2020 
Reg. and 1st Extraordinary Legis. Sesss. and Measures approved at the November 2020 Gen. Election). 
 206. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726. 
 207. Brief for Petitioners at 15, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 
3913762, at *15 [hereinafter Masterpiece Cakeshop, Brief for Petitioners]. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 28. 
 210. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–32; cf. id. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 211. Id. at 1742 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 212. Id. 
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words, cakes bearing symbols, and premade versus custom-made cakes together 
made the “free speech aspect” of the case “difficult.”213 
The Court’s punt on these issues will surely be returned. Not only has the 
issue come up previously in a more solidly artistic context—wedding 
photography214—but it continues to be raised in cases brought by wedding 
florists, videographers, website designers, and others, including Phillips 
himself, who has been involved in two subsequent discrimination claims.215 
Given the future challenges to come, it is worth considering three 
positions on art’s relevance that were voiced in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Phillips’s 
claim was that “the Free Speech Clause applies because” his cakes “are his artistic 
expression.”216 According to his Supreme Court brief, he is as protected by the 
First Amendment as “a modern painter or sculptor, and his greatest 
masterpieces—his custom wedding cakes—are just as worthy of constitutional 
protection as an abstract painting like Piet Mondrian’s Broadway Boogie Woogie, 
a modern sculpture like Alexander Calder’s Flamingo, or a temporary artistic 
structure like Christo and Jeanne-Claude’s Running Fence.”217 The United States 
sided with Phillips, arguing that a “custom wedding cake can be sufficiently 
artistic to qualify as pure speech.”218 
Unwilling to go that far, another group thought the case turned on 
mediums, not the concept of art.219 Dale Carpenter and Eugene Volokh, who 
had supported an exemption for a wedding photographer in a previous case, 
 
 213. Id. at 1723 (majority opinion). 
 214. See Elane Photography, LLC, v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 63 (N.M. 2013). 
 215. See, e.g., Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 747 (8th Cir. 2019) (wedding 
videographers); 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 746 F. App’x 709, 710 (10th Cir. 2018) (wedding website 
designers); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 890, 896 (Ariz. 2019) (discussing 
wedding invitation designers); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1210 (Wash. 2019), 
petition for cert. filed, No. 19-333 (Sept. 11, 2019) (wedding florists); see also Brasch, supra note 27 
(describing the second and third complaints filed against Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop). 
 216. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Brief for Petitioners, supra note 207, at 16–17 (emphasis added). Phillips 
in fact went further, claiming that Colorado not only couldn’t compel art making like his, see id. at 28 
(“By enthroning itself as master of Phillips’s artistic voice, the [Colorado Civil Rights] Commission 
invaded the freedom that the First Amendment promises to artists.”), but that it couldn’t even order 
Phillips to report what commissions he declines. According to his brief, “the very notion of artistic 
freedom chafes at a requirement that Phillips must give an account to the government for the use of 
his artistic discretion.” Id. 
 217. Id. at 20–21; see also id. at 20 (“Like any good work of art, Phillips’s wedding cakes convey 
messages that address not only ‘the intellect’ but also ‘the emotions’ of observers.”). 
 218. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 24, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Masterpiece Cakeshop, Brief for the United States] 
(“[J]ust as a painter does more than simply apply paint to a canvas, a baker of a custom wedding cake 
does more than simply mix together eggs, flour, and sugar: Both apply their artistic talents and 
viewpoints to the endeavor.”). 
 219. Brief of American Unity Fund & Profs. Dale Carpenter & Eugene Volokh as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents at 1, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4918194, 
at *1 [hereinafter Masterpiece Cakeshop, Carpenter/Volokh Brief]. 
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drew the line at Masterpiece Cakeshop, arguing that it “would trivialize the First 
Amendment” to say that “baked goods, including very beautiful ones or ones 
intended for special occasions, are protected forms of ‘art.’”220 Their suggested 
test to differentiate painting, music, poetry, and parades from cake baking, 
clothing design, and hairstyling looks at whether a particular medium is 
inherently expressive or has historically been used for expressive purposes.221 
Other First Amendment scholars went further, arguing that neither the 
cake’s status as art, nor cake-making’s potential recognition as a traditional 
medium of expression, mattered in Masterpiece Cakeshop. As one prominent 
amicus group said, “The Court does not need to decide here whether bakers are 
artists,” for even Rembrandt would be subject to generally applicable 
antidiscrimination laws were he to put his paintings up for sale in the window 
of his shop.222 Artists and artisans223 both can be forced to sell their artistry to 
all comers; they just cannot be forced to create new messages.224 Going further 
still, amicus Tobias Wolff agreed with the point about paintings placed in the 
window225 but argued in addition that “an artist who sets up a business in which 
she sells her skills to any paying customer in the commercial marketplace is no 
 
 220. Id. at *14; see also id. at *10 (“Nor can wedding cakes be viewed as inherently expressive, or 
traditionally protected, simply by raising the level of generality and calling wedding-cake-making 
‘art’.”). 
 221. Id. at *6–14; see also id. at *7 (“[W]hen the medium as a whole mainly consists of items that 
do not convey a message (except perhaps insofar as words may be written on them), it is not protected 
by the First Amendment—even when the items may be designed with aesthetics in mind and even 
when the creator subjectively intends to ‘express’ something by the creation.”). 
 222. Brief of Floyd Abrams et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Masterpiece Cakeshop, Brief of Abrams et al.] (“If 
Rembrandt van Rijn puts ‘The Descent from the Cross’ in his shop window . . . the First Amendment 
would not condemn a law that says he may not refuse on grounds of ethnicity or religion the business 
of a Flemish man who wished to hang the painting in a Roman Catholic church.”). 
 223. While Post was a signatory to this brief, he drew a sharper distinction between artists and 
artisans in other contemporaneous writing. To quote his argument, which prefigures mine to come: 
We do not debate and articulate the meaning of current events through the medium of 
wedding cakes. We do not carry on national debates through the medium of flowers, cooking, 
jewelry or furniture. . . . [H]eightened First Amendment scrutiny has typically been reserved 
for laws that distort meanings conveyed in what the Court has called ‘media for the 
communication of ideas,’ in which participants are understood to be self-consciously seeking 
to address public ideas and matters. 
Robert Post, An Analysis of DOJ’s Brief in Masterpiece Cakeshop, TAKE CARE (Oct. 18, 2017) [hereinafter 
Post, An Analysis], https://takecareblog.com/blog/an-analysis-of-doj-s-brief-in-masterpiece-cakeshop 
[https://perma.cc/JQ7J-6KMS]. 
 224. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Brief of Abrams et al., supra note 222, at 4–6. 
 225. Brief of Professor Tobias B. Wolff as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 16–17, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Masterpiece Cakeshop, Brief of Wolff]. 
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longer engaged in the creation of her own work.” 226  Artists engaged in 
businesses like this are communicating the customer’s message, not their own.227 
The wedding vendor cases are by far the highest profile, but certainly not 
the only place where the arts run up against antidiscrimination laws. Consider 
this: since Title VII prohibits employers from hiring based on race—even when 
race is claimed to be a “bona fide occupational qualification”228—casting an all-
Black Porgy and Bess229 or exclusively minority actors as Founding Fathers in 
Hamilton violates federal employment discrimination law. Yet for all the race-
based casting on Broadway and in Hollywood,230 shockingly few cases have been 
brought to challenge it, and even fewer scholarly articles have analyzed the 
issue.231 
There have, however, been arts-related challenges to race discrimination 
in contracting, including recently at the Supreme Court. The leading case under 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 comes from Tennessee, where two Black men sued producers 
of the Bachelor/Bachelorette franchise.232 The first twenty-four seasons of the 
show had all featured White bachelors or bachelorettes and mostly White 
suitors. Plaintiffs argued that American Broadcasting Company was responding 
to—and reinforcing—its viewers’ distaste for interracial couples.233 The case 
was dismissed at the outset, however: the district court found that television 
programs are among the “artistic forms of expression” the First Amendment 
protects and allowing plaintiffs’ claims would necessarily affect the content and 
message these particular shows were (allegedly) trying to convey.234 
Last Term, the Supreme Court heard another § 1981 claim, this one 
concerning a cable provider’s channel lineup. 235  The petition for writ of 
 
 226. Id. at 15. 
 227. Id. at 12–13. 
 228. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting race discrimination in hiring); id. § 2000e-2(e) 
(offering a bona fide occupational qualification exception for hiring based on sex, religion, or national 
origin, but not race or color). As Post notes, Congress was aware of the issue raised by race-conscious 
casting in theater and film when it debated Title VII, but it failed to deal with the problem. See Robert 
Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 37 
n.169 (2000). 
 229. See Michael Cooper, The Complex History and Uneasy Present of ‘Porgy and Bess’, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/arts/music/porgy-bess-gershwin-metropolitan-opera.html 
[https://perma.cc/QD7W-ZK87] (Sept. 21, 2019) (describing how the Gershwins, in order to avoid 
performances in blackface, dictated that only Black performers could be cast in their opera—a licensing 
requirement still in effect for all worldwide productions). 
 230. A study of three months’ worth of casting announcements (or “breakdowns”) in 2006 found 
that 22.5% listed the role’s race as White and 8.1% as Black. See Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-
ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2007). 
 231. Russell Robinson’s 2007 article on the subject is the major exception. Id. at 1–2. 
 232. Claybrooks v. Am. Broad. Cos., 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 988–89 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (suing 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981). 
 233. Id. at 989. For an explanation of the capitalization choices here, see supra note 28. 
 234. Id. at 993, 999–1000. 
 235. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Assoc. of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1013 (2020). 
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certiorari in a companion case had argued that if cable companies were to be 
prohibited from taking account of race, the creators of Hamilton might be forced 
to cast a White George Washington.236 But the Court chose to hear a different 
case, and the resulting opinion clarified the causation standard for § 1981 claims 
without discussing art or freedom of expression at all. 
These are important, potentially sweeping, artistic exemption claims. But 
since courts have not done much grappling with them so far, I too will push off 
doing so until the discussion of future cases in Part III.237 
*    *    * 
Part I has shown artistic exemptions taking different forms. Categorizers 
argue that a certain law does not apply to artworks, while balancers acknowledge 
that it does, but insist that it shouldn’t, since the art’s expressive value 
outweighs whatever value the law in question is meant to promote. 
These two modes of argument are not as different as they first seem, 
however. Often the metaphysical distinctions at the heart of the categorizing 
arguments really have value judgments right under the surface. If pole dancing 
does not count as a choreographic performance for tax purposes in New York, 
that is surely because of value judgments about what dance is worth subsidizing, 
not just ontological arguments about the nature of dance. Meanwhile, the 
balancers generally don’t weigh the value of individual works, but entire 
categories—whether the paintings, prints, sculptures, or photographs at issue in 
Bery, the custom wedding cakes in Masterpiece Cakeshop, or the art photography 
in Svenson. When the balancing comes out in favor of some category of 
expression, definitional arguments return, as artists like Mastrovincenzo try to 
show that their work also falls within one of the now-protected categories. 
Insofar as the categorizing and balancing modes of argument blur into each 
other, it is because courts actually tend to employ a form of categorical balancing, 
where the relevant categories to be balanced are often mediums of expression. 
Importantly, art is not itself a medium of expression. Art is not among the 
categories that should get balanced under the First Amendment. As the next 
part shows, the category “art” actually does no constitutional work at all. 
II.  ART’S IRRELEVANCE 
Those seeking exemptions for art, as did nearly all the claimants described 
in Part I, 238  have a heavy burden to shoulder: they need to provide some 
limiting principle sufficient to keep art exemptions from swallowing the rule of 
 
 236. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, Comcast, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (No. 18-1171). 
 237. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 238. The one exception is the group of street vendors who argued in Bery on behalf of four specific 
mediums of expression: painting, sculpture, photography, and prints. See supra Section I.B.2. 
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law. And this principle needs to be one that goes some distance toward 
explaining why certain things (artworks), unlike other things, deserve 
exemptions from otherwise applicable laws. 
I doubt that those seeking art exemptions can meet this burden. But 
fortunately, there is no need to do so. The cases above presented another option. 
Oftentimes, courts have looked to individual mediums of expression rather than 
art as a whole in artistic exemption cases.239 And for good reason. Insofar as 
mediums of expression differ in large part based on their materiality—the very 
thing most likely to raise legal issues—they are uniquely relevant categories to 
use in deciding when exemptions under the First Amendment should be 
possible. 
Looking to mediums of expression rather than some overarching notion of 
art also allows us to draw on the disciplinary expertise of practitioners and 
scholars working within each medium. The way we talk of “artists,” “artsy 
people,” or “art scholars” masks the fact that practitioners create and scholars 
research not across art in general, but within specific mediums. “Artists” are 
really painters or architects, musicians, dancers, or playwrights—or maybe some 
specific combination but not all of the above. Art historians do something 
different than musicologists, dramaturgs, and so on; scholars and critics too tend 
to be similarly rooted in particular disciplines. We sometimes lump various 
disciplines together—under a heading like “the fine arts”—but these groupings 
are historically contingent and evolving. As I describe below, the various arts 
may be linked through a chain of analogies, such that every art has something 
in common with another art, but that doesn’t mean that the various arts all share 
anything in common. There are no necessary and sufficient conditions that 
would explain why the various arts should be treated the same way under the 
law or why they should be treated differently than non-art expression within 
the same medium. There is no apparent reason why literature, for example, 
should get the same exemptions as sculpture, theater, architecture, or ballet—
or why it should get any protection beyond that given to non-artistic, everyday 
prose (like the text you are reading right now). 
The rest of Part II develops this normative argument. 
A. Art Versus the Arts 
Dominic McIver Lopes is among the leading contemporary philosophers 
of art. 240  But that label fits Lopes somewhat awkwardly. For as he has 
powerfully argued, philosophy of art’s primary task—searching for a theory of 
art, an answer to the question: What makes object x a work of art?—is best 
 
 239. Supra Section I.B. 
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99 N.C. L. REV. 685 (2021) 
2021] THE CONSTITUTIONAL IRRELEVANCE OF ART 721 
pursued by “passing the buck” to two other theoretical projects.241 First is a 
theory of the arts, which seeks to explain why painting and sculpture, for example, 
should count among “the arts,” while fishing and skateboarding do not. A theory 
of the arts explains what makes certain kinds of objects or activities art. The 
second project is to develop theories of individual arts. These explain what makes 
a given object a painting or a certain activity a dance. Lopes argues that an 
account of what makes something architecture will necessarily differ from an 
account of what makes something music, and so on for each art, because theories 
of the arts must take account of the physical medium associated with each.242 
Lopes’s buck-passing theory of art holds that something is a work of art if 
and only if it is a work that is part of some art kind.243 So, for example, the 
Mona Lisa is a work of art because the Mona Lisa is a painting, and painting is 
one of the arts. The challenge is thus to explain what makes something a 
painting and what makes painting an art. The difference between this and the 
traditional task for the philosophy of art—coming up with a theory of art—is 
that, unlike a theory of art, Lopes’s buck-passing account does not require that 
all artworks share any particular trait.244 Paintings might all share a trait—for 
example, being painted!—without that trait needing to apply also to music or 
dance or architecture. 
Significantly for our purposes here, Lopes argues that we are more likely 
to succeed in asking whether certain hard cases should be categorized as part of 
an art kind rather than asking directly whether they count as art.245 In other 
words, it will be easier to decide whether Duchamp’s Fountain is sculpture246 or 
Cage’s 4’33” is music247 than to find some single principle by which we can say 
directly that both are art. In part, this is because the set of things that even 
arguably qualify as sculpture or music is far narrower and more homogenous 
than the set of things that are arguably art. (No one wonders whether 4’33” is 
sculpture, or if Fountain is an opera.) Finding workable definitions of each 
individual art is thus far more likely than defining art as a whole. 
Moreover, Lopes observes, “Art as a whole is not the object of any field of 
empirical inquiry. That is, there are no serious psychological, anthropological, 
 
 241. DOMINIC MCIVER LOPES, BEYOND ART 11–15 (2014). 
 242. Id. at 15. 
 243. See id. 
 244. See, e.g., id. at 62. 
 245. Id. at 63. 
 246. The urinal that Marcel Duchamp signed and dated was rejected for exhibition by the Society 
of Independent Artists in 1917. See DANTO, WHAT ART IS, supra note 73, at 26–28. 
 247. See Stephen Davies, John Cage’s 4’33”: Is It Music?, 75 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 448, 448 (1997) 
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sociological, or historical hypotheses about all and only works of art.”248 Lopes 
argues that his buck-passing theory “sends us off to theorize about the more 
specific phenomena that absorb the hours of musicologists, anthropologists of 
dance, sociologists of photography, and their peers.”249 
One final philosophical point before turning back to law. Everything just 
said about definitional buck passing—shifting from defining art to defining the 
various arts—can be said as well about aesthetic or artistic value. In other words, 
instead of giving a unified account of what counts as good art, we might instead 
pass the buck and try to decide what is valuable in painting, in music, in 
architecture, and so on.250 
So what does all of this tell us about art’s role in constitutional law? Several 
things, I hope. 
First, anyone who claims that art or art making merits an exemption from 
the law needs something like a theory of art. Without some criterion shared 
across the set of things called artworks, it is hard to see why those particular 
things should together qualify for an exemption. 
My summary of Lopes’s buck-passing account of art does not prove that 
it is impossible to define art directly—to identify the criterion that those 
claiming art exemptions would need. But it does give good reason to believe 
that focusing on individual arts instead is more likely to succeed. This is both 
because we’re more likely to find commonalities among the objects that are put 
forward, say, as sculpture than among all the things said to be art, and also 
because the individual arts are the subject of practical and scholarly knowledge 
in a way that art itself is not. These are reasons to think that passing the buck 
and considering exemptions for specific arts are likely to be more cabined and 
focused than considering exemptions for art in general. In any case, the burden 
is on those who think otherwise. They are the ones who need to offer a theory 
of art—one that helps justify exemptions and suggests how they’ll be feasibly 
limited. 
Second, a corollary of the first point: insofar as art exemption claims 
involve a balancing of values, focusing on specific arts rather than art in general 
should again prove more helpful. As before, Lopes doesn’t disprove the 
possibility of offering a unified account of aesthetic or artistic value. But he 
suggests that it will be far easier to develop an account of what makes 
photography or architecture or poetry good than to find some good-making 
feature that all forms share.251 Since balancing requires that we know what value 
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should be placed on art’s side of the balance, Lopes’s buck-passing account 
suggests that we will be more successful if we weigh each art separately. At the 
end of Part I, I suggested that categorical balancing of this sort is exactly what 
most courts have actually done. 
Third, we can learn from what Lopes says about that to which his buck-
passing theory passes the buck: the various arts. These are narrower categories, 
obviously, than art itself, but also narrower than midlevel categories like “visual 
arts,” “narrative arts,” and “performing arts.”252 At the same time, the individual 
arts are generally broader categories than genres (like rap, or Westerns), styles 
(like Mannerism), or oeuvres (like that of Mozart).253 Lopes proposes that the 
arts are individuated by their medium, where medium is defined as a resource 
(often material like canvas, stone, bodies, or tones) to which a technique 
(drawing, printing, carving, arranging, and so on) is applied.254 
Without wading too far into the weeds of how to individuate various 
mediums of expression, we can already see a major advantage of talking about 
individual arts rather than art in general. Individual arts are differentiated by 
medium. The concept of art, by contrast, combines a wide variety of mediums. 
And yet it is precisely the medium—the materiality of an artwork and/or the 
techniques applied there—that is most likely, and properly, the subject of legal 
regulation. 
To give a few examples: The most likely and legitimate reason to regulate 
music is because of its volume.255 Depictions by actors in the theater and movies 
raise potential regulatory issues that depictions in novels and paintings do not, 
for the former involve real people.256 The law might therefore care, legitimately, 
that the actors involved in theater and movies are underage or are denied 
employment because of their race. Poorly designed architecture can cause harm 
of a different sort than a bad poem: unlike the poem, architecture can cause 
physical injury and environmental damage, and even its purely aesthetic 
demerits can intrude upon passersby or the neighbors across the street, whereas 
bad poems can more easily be avoided. 
The law’s willingness to countenance art exemptions surely needs to be 
sensitive to the varied harms the various arts potentially pose. And these threats 
are most likely to vary based on the distinctive medium each art employs. 
Regulating novels is almost always going to be a regulation of content or 
 
 252. See id. at 134. 
 253. Id. at 133. 
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 255. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989). 
 256. Thus, a movie version of Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita raises concerns that the novel itself does 
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expression, for what else about a novel is likely to cause harm? But that puts 
novels in a very different relation to law than architecture, or photography, or 
performance art. To quote again a deep insight offered by the Supreme Court 
in a 1975 theater case: “Each medium of expression . . . must be assessed for 
First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its 
own problems.”257 
B. The Arts Versus Mediums of Expression 
But here an objection arises: How have I shown the concept of art to be 
irrelevant if all I’ve done is switch from talking about art to talking about artistic 
mediums—that is to say, “the arts”? In Lopes’s terms, how far has the buck been 
passed if, rather than talking about a theory of art, we simply start talking about 
a theory of the arts—a set of conditions that allows us to treat certain kinds of 
things as art kinds, and therefore candidates for exemptions? 
Two responses, one much bolder than the other: 
First, finding a satisfactory definition of “the arts” is as unlikely as finding 
necessary and sufficient conditions for “art” itself.258 Lopes himself thinks that 
“disputes over the art status of various activities appeal to analogies and 
disanalogies that hold only among subsets of the arts.”259 In other words, rather 
than finding something all of the arts have in common, new arts get recognized 
by establishing similarities with neighboring arts, not the whole set. The art 
status of video games, for example, “is often established by stressing their 
connections to cinema but they may be viewed instead as the popular 
counterpart of avant-garde computer art.”260 Video games don’t have to show 
something in common with sculpture or ballet to be accepted among the arts. 
What is included or not therefore depends on what is already there. The 
list is historically variable and path dependent.261 In a pair of famous articles 
from the early 1950s, Paul Oskar Kristeller traced the emergence of what he 
called the “modern system of the arts” during the eighteenth century.262 Only 
then, Kristeller argued, did the notion of the “fine arts” come to be systematized 
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as painting, sculpture, architecture, music, and poetry.263 Earlier groupings—
like the liberal arts or the list of Muses—tended to lump music with 
mathematics or astronomy, poetry with grammar, and visual art with manual 
crafts.264 Later, once the five canonical arts had been established, others like 
dance, theater, opera, prose literature, and (perhaps more surprising to us now) 
gardening sometimes did, or sometimes didn’t, get included as well.265 
At the time, commentators tried to show that “the ‘imitation of beautiful 
nature’ is the principle common to all the arts.”266 Clearly, that will no longer 
work as a unifying principle for the arts today, where both beauty and imitation 
are, at best, optional qualities. But even if it did work as a unifying principle, 
“imitation of beautiful nature” is a criterion that wouldn’t do much to suggest 
why the arts should be a candidate for legal exemptions. The point, which the 
following section revisits, is that even if some satisfying definition of art or the 
arts were found, it still might not give us any reason to think that art (or the 
arts) merits special constitutional protection. 
And indeed it doesn’t. The real answer to the objection—that talk of 
artistic mediums continues to make art relevant to constitutional law—is to 
acknowledge the unlikelihood of finding a criterion shared amongst artistic 
mediums and to go a step further: to say that it makes no constitutional sense 
to subdivide mediums of expression into that which is and is not artistic. Some 
prose is literary, other prose is not. What matters to the First Amendment is 
that prose is a traditional, indeed vital, medium of expression. That some prose 
might also be deemed art does not change the level of protection it does or 
should receive. 
To be clear, then, this is where my concerns diverge from those of Lopes, 
writing within the philosophy of art rather than constitutional law. Unlike his, 
my claim is not that we need to pass the buck from talk of art to talk of the arts 
and, ultimately, to the question of whether some object belongs within one of 
those arts. My claim is that, in law, we need to move from talk of art—
unpromising and misleading as it is—to talk of mediums of expression. 
Decisions about whether to recognize some medium of expression for First 
Amendment coverage purposes will, like Lopes’s theory of the arts, rely on 
analogies from one to another—not commonalities among them all. 
Recognizing a new medium of expression267 is not applying a necessary and 
 
 263. Kristeller, Arts (I), supra note 262, at 497. 
 264. Id. at 505–06. 
 265. Id. at 497. 
 266. Kristller, Arts (II), supra note 262, at 21 (citing CHARLES BATTEUX, LES BEAUX ARTS 
RÉDUITS À UN MÊME PRINCIPE (1747)). 
 267. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (departing from an earlier 
Supreme Court decision treating movies as commercial spectacles and holding instead that “motion 
pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas”). 
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sufficient condition to a new set of things; it is finding a historically contingent 
but relevant line from a recognized medium or mediums to some new one. The 
point is that the medium of expression could be an artistic one (like music), a 
non-artistic one (like billboards), or a mixed one (like video games). Talk of 
mediums of expression is not limited to artistic mediums or the subset of things 
within a mixed medium that count as art.268 Whether something is expressed 
using a traditional medium of expression matters greatly. The concept of art 
does not. 
C. The Informative Failure of Leading Theories of Art 
The argument just made rests on pessimism about the prospects of any 
overarching theory of art, much less one that could justify legal exemptions. By 
contrast, employing mediums of expression is not only more manageable, but 
by individuating forms of expression based on their medium, it focuses our 
attention on the very thing about art that the law most likely and legitimately 
wants to regulate. 
It’s worth noting, however, that there are overarching theories of art 
currently on offer. In fact, producing them is something of a cottage industry 
within contemporary philosophy of art.269 Before moving on, then, this section 
looks briefly at three of the most prominent or promising theories to see how 
they fare. This serves two important purposes. First, it shows that even if these 
theories of art were successful—and not wildly over- or underinclusive as their 
critics claim—they would still not explain why art, so defined, is a category of 
things that merit exemptions from otherwise applicable laws.270 Second, and 
even more importantly, these theories, despite their faults, may help explain 
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why “art” has the rhetorical power in law that it clearly does. This section thus 
provides an error theory that partially explains why arthood is invoked so often 
if it really has the constitutional irrelevance I claim it to have. The three theories 
that follow have shaped our constitutional jurisprudence in important ways 
even if they have failed to provide a concept of art that provides a categorical 
ground for exemptions. 
First, consider the Institutional Theory of Art (“Institutional Theory”), 
according to which “something is a work of art as a result of its being dubbed 
. . . a work of art by someone who is authorized thereby to make it an artwork 
by her position within the institution of the Artworld.”271 To avoid getting lost 
in technicalities, I’ll describe this and each of the following theories in 
connection to its main proponent. For the Institutional Theory, that is the 
philosopher of art George Dickie.272 
Putting aside the circularity of Dickie’s definition—which defines art in 
terms of an Artworld, and an Artworld in terms of art273—we might in the 
present context worry more about why the decisions of something called “the 
Artworld” should be a source of constitutional exemptions to the law. The fact 
that the Institutional Theory is a procedural rather than substantive theory of 
art—regardless of whether that makes it better or worse as a theory—certainly 
makes it less useful in justifying exemptions. After all, the theory gives us no 
reason to believe that the Artworld’s reasons for dubbing something “art” 
correspond in any way with values the First Amendment is meant to promote. 
Worse, for the law to treat expressive objects differently based on the whims of 
the Artworld could raise worries that, depending on how the Artworld is 
constituted, it might perpetuate conservative, “institutionalist” biases against 
outsider art and other expression, especially by minorities or other 
nonprivileged speakers. For the law to adopt and enforce these prejudices is 
constitutionally problematic in its own right.274 
At the same time, in discussing mediums of expression above, I wrote of 
the practical and scholarly knowledge that has developed within many such 
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mediums. 275  Painters and art historians, composers, instrumentalists, and 
musicologists—all are authorities on their respective mediums. They are people 
we might turn to when deciding whether hard cases count as a painting, say, or 
music. Here is where something like the Institutional Theory has some appeal. 
Those working in and on each medium of expression might have useful things 
to say about what falls within it and what does not. But that is different from 
saying that something is a painting because “the Artworld” says so276—or that 
something called “the Artworld,” rather than medium-specific communities of 
expertise, exists at all. 
Second, we might turn from procedural theories to substantive ones and 
seek some essential feature that all artworks share. One leading example comes 
from Danto, whose philosophical account describes artworks as “embodied 
meanings.”277 This is to say, first, that artworks—unlike mere things—are about 
something.278 But more than this, they embody that which they are about: (some 
of) their material properties are themselves part of the meaning.279 Artworks 
show, or exemplify,280 what they are about.281 
Unlike the Institutional Theory, Danto’s essentialist account of art at least 
points to something—meaning—that is relevant to the First Amendment, and 
that artworks are all said to share. But to say that artworks are about something 
is, in itself, to make them no different from any other form of expression. For 
proponents of art exemptions, the question has to be: How is art special in 
comparison to other things that bear meaning? 
This is where Danto’s embodiment criterion comes in. Artworks 
exemplify their meaning; their material properties express something about 
their message. And sure enough, this point is made in any number of the 
examples canvased in Part I. The art vendors in New York City claimed that 
the selling of their works on the streets was itself a crucial part of the works’ 
meaning; the junked car artist in Texas alleged content discrimination, arguing 
that the junked car medium exemplified the work’s message about car culture 
and the environment. The appeal of Danto’s theory in the art exemption 
context, thus, is clear: if something is art, then—according to the theory—
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regulating the material nature of the work is often to regulate its meaning, 
thereby giving rise to First Amendment worries. 
Putting philosophy aside, the legal difficulty here is one that has been 
mentioned already: exemplified meaning is a particular challenge for Free 
Speech law.282 Nothing expresses hostility more than a punch in the face. But 
surely most of the expressive conduct that exemplifies hostility cannot be seen 
as speech; the First Amendment is no defense to a charge of aggravated assault. 
Since, as Danto believes, anything can be art (which is not to say that everything 
is art),283 art exemptions could be invoked on behalf of anything. Danto’s theory 
of art does not provide a useful limiting principle when legal conflicts arise, 
particularly over the ways in which art’s meaning is embodied. 
Third and finally, theories of art that emphasize aesthetic experience might 
seem able to cabin the expansiveness of Danto’s theory of art, since not 
everything seems like a promising source of aesthetic enjoyment.284 Here we 
can look to Monroe Beardsley’s aesthetic definition: “An artwork is something 
produced with the intention of giving it the capacity to satisfy the aesthetic 
interest.”285 Beardsley cashes out “aesthetic interest” in terms of the quest to 
have an aesthetic experience, in which we attend to an object’s perceptual 
features and formal design while bracketing out our own practical interests or 
outside concerns.286 Beardsley’s notion of aesthetic experience descends from a 
long tradition in philosophical aesthetics in which thinkers dating back to 
Immanuel Kant and Francis Hutcheson in the eighteenth century have tied the 
aesthetic to disinterested contemplation—a stance in which we insulate 
aesthetic judgment from moral, political, or practical judgments about how a 
work might make the world better or promote our own personal interests.287 
Aesthetic theories of art have a deep hold on the law. I have described 
elsewhere U.S. law’s penchant for distinguishing beauty from utility, whether 
in tariff, copyright, or patent law.288 The strictness with which the law excludes 
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 288. See Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment, supra note 36, at 407–12, 437–42. 
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objects capable of any practical use from benefits like reduced tariffs289 is surely 
a reaction to the fact that we can take a disinterested aesthetic stance to any 
number of things that the law has good reason for regulating. A benefit or 
exemption intended for art could easily be extended to tools, furniture, 
appliances or many other things if the relevant test was merely, “Can this object 
spark an aesthetic experience?” After all, we can take different stances on an 
object at different times. And this is a problem for anyone wanting to base 
constitutional art exemptions on an aesthetic theory of art. Beardsley’s aesthetic 
theory might not be as capacious as Danto’s embodiment theory—surely there 
are some things, after all, that are just too disgusting or banal to prompt 
aesthetic experiences. But as camp, 290  everyday aesthetics, 291  and pop art 292 
show, people can derive aesthetic experiences from things far outside the 
bounds of traditional mediums of expression: perhaps even terrorist acts, as the 
especially controversial example of composer Karlheinz Stockhausen 
suggests.293 
That said, the aesthetic theory of art does have an especially crucial lesson 
to teach about traditional mediums of expression. Some mediums have become 
traditional precisely because they are so well suited for providing aesthetic 
experiences. Some may only be suited for that purpose. There is just not much 
else you can do with an opera, symphony, ballet, or novel but enjoy its aesthetic 
qualities. Contrast these with, say, a beautiful car, chair, or teapot, which can be 
appreciated either as an aesthetic object or as a tool for transporting, sitting, or 
steeping. Certain traditional mediums of expression are uniquely efficient at 
delivering aesthetic experiences and for doing so without remainder—in other 
words, without doing anything else. Since the law ordinarily has no business 
regulating aesthetic experience itself, works in these mediums leave the law with 
little that it might legitimately regulate. 
It makes sense, then, that the Supreme Court should regard these 
mediums as “unquestionably shielded.”294 What does not make sense, though, 
is to expand this shield by unthinkingly extrapolating from these traditional 
mediums of expression, which so efficiently and exclusively provoke aesthetic 
experiences, to the much wider set of things capable of provoking aesthetic 
experiences. The wedding cakes at issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop show this 
 
 289. See id. at 407–10. 
 290. See Susan Sontag, Notes on ‘Camp’, 31 PARTISAN REV. 515, 515 (1964). 
 291. See YURIKO SAITO, EVERYDAY AESTHETICS 54 (2007). 
 292. See Marshall W. Fishwick, Pop Art and Pop Culture, 3 J. POPULAR CULTURE 23, 23–24 (1969). 
 293. See Anthony Tommasini, Music, The Devil Made Him Do It, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2001), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/30/arts/music-the-devil-made-him-do-it.html 
[https://perma.cc/7WPC-UDQ9] (describing Stockhausen’s comments characterizing the 9/11 attacks 
as “the greatest work of art that is possible in the whole cosmos”). 
 294. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) 
(referring to abstract painting, instrumental music, and nonsense poetry). 
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extrapolation in action. 295  Phillips’s cakes are gorgeous; they can provide 
aesthetic pleasure in abundance. But cakes do much more than that, and like 
anything else meant for ingestion, they are ripe for legal regulation to an extent 
that novels and symphonies should never be. 
Like the other theories, aesthetic theories of art say something important 
about why we might be tempted to offer art exemptions: mediums of expression 
that have evolved solely to provide aesthetic experiences and nothing else are 
unlikely subjects for legitimate legal regulation. But lots of things can prompt 
aesthetic experiences. Using aesthetics as a criterion for legal exemptions 
without limiting them to specific mediums of expression, or without varying 
the exemptions medium by medium, would force the law to take a disinterested 
stance toward things that should legitimately interest it. Mediums like 
photography, with its (sometimes) real human subjects; architecture, with its 
intrusions on the lived and natural environment; marches, with their potential 
to hurt, disrupt, or exclude 296 —these mediums offer aesthetic experiences 
entwined with nonaesthetic and legally salient effects and injuries. Aesthetic 
experiences provided by expressive objects or events that do not employ 
traditional mediums of expression—think hunger strikes, riots, or, again, 
terrorist attacks—are even more problematic from the law’s perspective. An 
aesthetic theory of art, used as the basis for artistic exemption claims, would 
flatten these distinctions. By contrast, focusing on mediums of expression 
brings the varied costs of exemptions to the foreground. 
*    *    * 
The normative argument made in this part has three steps. First, it 
expresses skepticism about the possibility of finding a trait shared by all 
artworks, especially one that would support artistic exemptions in law. Second, 
it highlights reasons to be more optimistic about defining mediums of 
expression, given their more limited reach compared to “art” and the fact that 
many of them have spawned rich practical and scholarly bodies of knowledge. 
Finally, since the materiality that distinguishes mediums of expression is likely 
the very thing the law has business regulating, individuating mediums of 
expression allows us to evaluate different mediums differently for exemption 
purposes, instead of lumping them indiscriminately together under a catchall 
category like art. Constitutional law thus should jettison the concept of art in 
favor of its traditional emphasis on mediums of expression, whether artistic or 
not. 
 
 295. See supra Section I.B.3. 
 296. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 581 (allowing the exclusion of gay, lesbian, and bisexual marchers in a 
St. Patrick’s Day parade). 
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The following part argues that Supreme Court doctrine largely already 
does jettison the concept of art—and that important recent and pending cases 
would be simpler if advocates and scholars would do so too. Section III.A 
describes the Supreme Court’s surprisingly underrecognized focus on mediums 
of expression. Section III.B then returns to some of the case studies above to 
show how discarding talk of art would improve future disputes over legal 
exemption claims made on art’s behalf. 
III.  LAW WITHOUT “ART” 
A. Supreme Court Doctrine 
The claim that the concept of art is constitutionally irrelevant is less 
revisionary than it sounds. To be sure, advocates constantly argue for art’s 
special constitutional status. That is the basis of the artistic exemption claims 
made throughout the law, as detailed in Part I. Similarly, scholars working to 
justify First Amendment coverage for art often assume that art is the category 
in need of justification. 297  But look a bit deeper, and even some of these 
scholarly accounts of constitutional coverage of art devolve into discussions of 
particular mediums of expression. 298  To take one prominent contemporary 
example: while Mark Tushnet has at times written of art and artistic expression 
in general when talking about the First Amendment,299 his recent book on the 
subject, written with Alan Chen and Joseph Blocher, is careful to focus on 
specific mediums of expression or even subsets of those mediums—
 
 297. See, e.g., RANDALL P. BEZANSON, ART AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 280 (2009) (“How can 
art be defined and distinguished from the forms of ‘art’ that already are protected because they fit the 
free speech paradigm?”); Hamilton, supra note 23, at 109 (offering a theory for why “nonrational, 
nondiscursive elements of art are important to the republican democratic enterprise”); Robert Post, 
Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 486 (2011) [hereinafter Post, Participatory 
Democracy] (“Art and other forms of no[n]cognitive, nonpolitical speech fit comfortably within the 
scope of public discourse.”); Post, Participatory Democracy, supra, at 620 (“[I] consider art as deserving 
constitutional protection because of its connection to public opinion formation in a democracy.”); id. 
at 621 (“So long as Brokeback Mountain, and indeed all forms of communication that sociologically we 
recognize as art, form part of the process by which society ponders what it believes and thinks, it is 
protected under a theory of the First Amendment that stresses democratic participation.”). 
 298. Just after claiming that art fits “comfortably within the scope of public discourse,” for example, 
Post goes on to specify that “First Amendment doctrine typically regards communication within 
recognized media as presumptively within public discourse and hence within the scope of the First 
Amendment.” Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 297, at 486; see also Post, Recuperating, supra note 
193, at 1253–56 (discussing Warhol’s film Sleep and Duchamp’s Fountain as members of “recognized 
medium[s] for the communication of ideas”). Similarly, Sheldon Nahmod’s account of “artistic 
expression” and the First Amendment clarifies in an early footnote that “[w]hile this Article deals 
primarily with the visual arts of painting and sculpture, much of the analysis is applicable to 
architecture, music and literature.” Nahmod, supra note 23, at 222 n.2. 
 299. See MARK TUSHNET, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION § 3.2 
(2018) (“[F]ew scholars of freedom of expression doubt that artistic expression is covered.”). 
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instrumental music, nonrepresentational visual art, and nonsense poetry (and 
other text).300 
1.  Mediums in Supreme Court Doctrine 
These free speech scholars who focus on mediums are faithful to the 
Supreme Court’s own approach in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and 
Bisexual Group of Boston,301 which unanimously affirmed that “the Constitution 
looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of expression” and must 
cover more than expression with a “narrow, succinctly articulable message.” 
Were it otherwise, the First Amendment “would never reach the 
unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold 
Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”302 Painting, music, and 
poetry are protected, the Court said in Hurley, even if it is nonrepresentational 
or nonsensical.303 But that is because those works are members of recognized 
and protected mediums of expression—not because they are works of art.304 
By contrast, Professor Tushnet thinks that “the fact that something is 
denominated ‘art’ changes the constitutional landscape dramatically,”305 and he 
wonders why that should be so for nonrepresentational art.306 Here, he and I 
part ways. For me, the relevant question is not “Why do we protect 
nonrepresentational painting or instrumental music?,” but rather “Why do we 
deem painting and music to be traditional mediums of expression?” For the way 
the Supreme Court’s free speech doctrine has proceeded is by identifying a 
given medium of expression as protected and then applying coverage307 to all 
works within that medium, whether representational or not.308 
As such, the Supreme Court at first didn’t extend First Amendment 
coverage to movies, lumping them not with the press but instead with theater, 
 
 300. See generally TUSHNET, CHEN & BLOCHER, supra note 23. 
 301. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 302. Id. 569. 
 303. Id. 
 304. TUSHNET, CHEN & BLOCHER, supra note 23, at 143. As Joseph Blocher argues, “Jabberwocky 
is covered by the First Amendment not because its words represent concepts but because it is 
recognizable as a poem.” Id. 
 305. Id. at 103. 
 306. See id. at 70. 
 307. To apply coverage is not necessarily to apply protection. See Frederick Schauer, The 
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
1765, 1769 (2004) (distinguishing material that the First Amendment applies to (covered material) from 
that covered material which the government is prohibited from regulating in a particular way (protected 
material)). 
 308. See Post, Recuperating, supra note 193, at 1253 (“[The Supreme Court] assumed that if a 
medium were constitutionally protected by the First Amendment, each instance of the medium would 
also be protected; courts need not and perhaps should not ask whether any particular film succeeded in 
communicating its specific message.”). 
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circuses, pantomime, and other “shows and spectacles.”309 It wasn’t until 1952 
that the Supreme Court formally changed course, admitting that “motion 
pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas.” 310  But 
importantly, in the same case, the Court noted that although basic First 
Amendment principles remain constant, that doesn’t mean that “motion 
pictures are necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other 
particular method of expression. Each method,” the Court said, “tends to 
present its own peculiar problems.”311 
Time after time, the Supreme Court or its individual Justices have heeded 
this caution and treated mediums of expression separately rather than lumping 
them together under terms like art or the arts. Public speechmaking, radio, 
books, magazines, newspapers, television, 312  the mail, 313  posters, signs, and 
billboards, 314 marches or parades, 315 leaflets and sound trucks, 316 picketing,317 
and internet websites318—the Court has recognized all of these mediums over 
the years, along with “pictures, films, paintings, drawings, and engravings, . . . 
oral utterance and the printed word.” 319 The Court recently added another 
recognized medium, video games, although Justice Scalia’s analysis in Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n320 was fairly cursory: 
Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video 
games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many 
familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) 
and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s 
interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First 
Amendment protection.321 
It is worth reiterating that the Court’s argument is not that video games are 
artworks and therefore protected. Rather, video games comprise a medium of 
expression, the techniques and material resources of which are sufficiently 
 
 309. Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 243 (1915), overruled by Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); see also John Wertheimer, Mutual Film Reviewed: The 
Movies, Censorship, and Free Speech in Progressive America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 158, 160 (1993). 
 310. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). 
 311. Id. at 503 (equating “media of communications of ideas” with “methods of expression”). 
 312. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 51 (1961) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
 313. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 137–38 (1981) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
 314. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (plurality opinion); id. at 
524 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 315. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995). 
 316. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977). 
 317. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988). 
 318. United States v. Am. Lib. Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 227–28 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 319. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1973). 
 320. 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
 321. Id. at 790. 
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analogous to those of other previously recognized mediums of expression for 
coverage to be merited here as well.322 
Though the bare majority that decided Brown ignored the point, one 
dissenting Justice and two who concurred in the judgment emphasized how—
in the Court’s previous words—“each medium of expression presents special 
First Amendment problems.” 323  Justice Breyer worried in Brown about the 
unique combination of expression with physical action often present in video 
games;324 meanwhile, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, was struck 
by the uniquely realistic, immersive, and interactive worlds video games 
typically offer.325 “When all of the characteristics of video games are taken into 
account,” Justice Alito wrote, “there is certainly a reasonable basis for thinking 
that the experience of playing a video game may be quite different from the 
experience of reading a book, listening to a radio broadcast, or viewing a 
movie.”326 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Breyer were reflecting the 
Court’s longstanding notion that “[e]ach method of communicating ideas is ‘a 
law unto itself’ and that law must reflect the ‘differing natures, values, abuses 
and dangers’ of each method.”327 As technology and society have changed and 
new mediums of expression have come before the Court, “[t]he uniqueness of 
each medium of expression has been a frequent refrain.”328 
Art itself is not a medium of expression. Providing blanket coverage across 
all artworks would prevent the Court from attending to the unique challenges 
presented by the various mediums of expression, whether artistic, non-artistic, 
or mixed. 
 
 322. Id. 
 323. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). 
 324. Brown, 564 U.S. at 847 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 325. Id. at 820 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (plurality opinion) (quoting 
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949)). 
 328. Id. at 501 n.8; see also id. at 557–58 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“As all those joining in today’s 
disposition necessarily recognize, ‘[e]ach medium of expression . . . must be assessed for First 
Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems.’ The uniqueness 
of the medium, the availability of alternative means of communication, and the public interest the 
regulation serves are important factors to be weighed; and the balance very well may shift when 
attention is turned from one medium to another.” (citations omitted) (first quoting id. at 501 n.8 
(plurality opinion)); and then quoting id. at 527 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment))). But see 
Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Ohio, 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(“Motion pictures are of course a different medium of expression than the public speech, the radio, the 
stage, the novel, or the magazine. But the First Amendment draws no distinction between the various 
methods of communicating ideas.”). 
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2.  Counterarguments 
Arguing against this doctrinal point, Professor Tushnet offers two strong 
counterexamples that, he thinks, demonstrate the Supreme Court’s belief that 
all art is “presumptively covered by the First Amendment”: National 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley329 and obscenity law.330 
Take Finley first, a challenge to the moralistic criteria the National 
Endowment for the Arts (“NEA”) began using in awarding grants starting in 
1990.331 Congress had dictated that arts grants be based not just on “artistic 
merit” standing alone but also “taking into consideration general standards of 
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American 
public.” 332  Performance artists who had been denied grants brought suit, 
claiming that the decency requirement constituted viewpoint discrimination in 
violation of the First Amendment.333 
Tushnet’s argument is that no one would think of bringing a First 
Amendment challenge to most selective government subsidies outside the arts 
context—to defense contracts or support for farmers, for example.334 The fact 
that the parties and courts involved in Finley all unthinkingly applied the First 
Amendment shows, according to Tushnet, that “art” is a constitutionally 
relevant concept—a First Amendment trigger.335 
To forestall this conclusion, we might say that as long as the plaintiffs 
themselves were artists working in a particular medium of expression, the 
Supreme Court never needed to reach the question, or make the assumption, 
that all art is covered. But since the plaintiffs in Finley were raising a facial 
challenge to the NEA’s criteria across the board,336 I think a better response is 
to look to what it is the NEA actually endows. 
The NEA’s enabling legislation defines “the arts” to include: 
music (instrumental and vocal), dance, drama, folk art, creative writing, 
architecture and allied fields, painting, sculpture, photography, graphic 
and craft arts, industrial design, costume and fashion design, motion 
pictures, television, radio, film, video, tape and sound recording, the arts 
related to the presentation, performance, execution, and exhibition of 
 
 329. 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
 330. TUSHNET, CHEN & BLOCHER, supra note 23, at 102–03. 
 331. Finley, 524 U.S. at 572–73 (1998). 
 332. Id. at 572 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)). 
 333. Id. at 577. 
 334. See TUSHNET, CHEN & BLOCHER, supra note 23, at 103. To be clear, these examples are 
mine, not Tushnet’s. 
 335. Id. 
 336. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 580. 
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such major art forms, [and] all those traditional arts practiced by the 
diverse peoples of this country.337 
This is a list of mediums of expression. Art as an umbrella term is nowhere to 
be found. In place of a theory of art, or even a theory of the arts,338 federal law 
enumerates a list of mediums. Were the NEA to give money to, say, non-artistic 
sound recordings or television shows, its decency requirement would be subject 
to the same challenge under the First Amendment because a traditional medium 
of expression would still be affected. Arthood is not the necessary trigger. 
Turning to Tushnet’s second objection: he says the Court’s obscenity cases 
have “simply assumed that material that can be described as sufficiently artistic 
cannot be obscene.”339 In fact, the current test for obscenity, from the 1973 case 
Miller v. California, 340 does say that works can be obscene only if they lack 
“serious . . . artistic . . . value.”341 This would seem to be a clear art exemption, 
compelled by the First Amendment and, thus, a strong counterexample to my 
thesis that art is constitutionally irrelevant. 
Yet things look a bit different once we fill in the ellipses in the quotation 
from Miller. Obscenity, the Miller Court held, must be limited to works that, 
“taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value.”342 It’s tautological, of course, that only artworks can have artistic value. 
But the inclusion of literary value alongside artistic value suggests that “artistic” 
is being used not as a catchall concept, but in a more medium-specific way, 
referring to quality in the visual arts. A painting, print, drawing, movie, or 
photograph with artistic value, just like a piece of writing with literary value, 
cannot be criminalized as obscene. 343  Since obscenity is a concept largely 
confined to a few specific mediums of expression—basically, prose and 
pictures344—talk of literary and artistic value is really tied more to specific 
mediums of expression than to any notion of art in general. This is an example 
of art’s dual meaning: the broader, umbrella concept that has been invoked 
throughout this Article, and the narrower, “art gallery” sense, where “art” just 
refers to visual mediums. The fact that the Miller test references the narrow, 
 
 337. 20 U.S.C. § 952(b). 
 338. For the distinction between a theory of art, a theory of the arts, and theories of arts, see supra 
notes 241–42 and accompanying text. 
 339. TUSHNET, CHEN & BLOCHER, supra note 23, at 102. 
 340. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 341. Id. at 24. 
 342. Id. (emphasis added). 
 343. For more on how this standard is applied, see Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment, supra note 36, at 
419–26. For a great descriptive account that disrupts the widespread view that obscenity prosecutions 
no longer happen, see generally Jennifer M. Kinsley, The Myth of Obsolete Obscenity, 33 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 607 (2015). 
 344. See Edward J. Eberle, Art as Speech, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 26 (2007). 
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medium-focused sense of artistic does not show that the broad concept used in 
artistic exemption claims has constitutional significance. 
That’s one potential response. A second goes the other direction and notes 
that, by including artistic value alongside not only literary value, but political 
and scientific value, too, the Miller test can really be rephrased or understood as 
referring to anything that has value beyond its ability to provoke sexual arousal. 
This is how Frederick Schauer, for example, famously analyzed obscenity: as a 
“sexual surrogate” that “takes pictorial or linguistic form only because some 
individuals achieve sexual gratification by those means.” 345  On Schauer’s 
account, what the Supreme Court has actually done346 in its obscenity cases is 
to isolate “material devoid of intellectually communicative content”—“to 
separate speech from non-speech.”347 Here the point is not to decide whether 
some book or picture is art but whether it communicates rather than merely 
titillates. 
On either of these two readings, art as an umbrella concept does no work 
even in the one area of free speech law that would seem explicitly to invoke 
it.348 
3.  Application in the Lower Courts 
The Supreme Court has, with the possible exception of obscenity, 
resolutely focused on individual mediums of expression rather than the concept 
of art. But lower courts have not always been so fastidious.349 Part I’s examples 
of appellate decisions on junked cars, privacy, and trademark illustrate the 
point. 
 
 345. Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”: An Exercise in the 
Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 922 (1979). 
 346. See id. at 900 (“In order fully to understand the Court’s approach to obscenity, it is necessary 
to ignore much of what the Court has said about its approach, and look instead at what it has done.”). 
 347. Id. at 930. 
 348. For those unsatisfied by these rebuttals, I would only add that if the doctrinal mess that is 
obscenity law is the one place where the concept of art remains constitutionally relevant, that’s not 
much of a score for my opponents. See, e.g., Kinsley, supra note 343, at 609 (“To a person, First 
Amendment scholars have argued of late that obscenity law is obsolete, outdated, unused, and therefore 
has little ongoing impact on the status of free expression in this country.”); Andrew Koppelman, Does 
Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1635, 1636 (2005) (“[T]he doctrine is unworkable 
and should be abandoned.”). Those unmoved by my responses above can simply treat obscenity as one 
place where my thesis about art’s irrelevance is a revisionary call for change rather than a description 
of current doctrine. 
 349. See, e.g., Disc. Inn, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 803 F.3d 317, 326 (7th Cir. 2015) (Posner, J.) 
(“We must be careful not to impose a minimal standard of ‘expressiveness’ for determining when an 
object is art and therefore protected by the First Amendment from government prohibition or destruction.” 
(emphasis added)); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804 (Cal. 2001) (“[T]he 
United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a work of art is protected by the First Amendment 
even if it conveys no discernable message . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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Recall that in Kleinman, the junked car case, the Fifth Circuit treated 
Hurley’s Jabberwocky passage as “refer[ring] solely to great works of art.”350 The 
Supreme Court, it said, has never “elaborated on the extent of First 
Amendment protection for visual non-speech objects or artworks.”351 The Fifth 
Circuit’s opinion is not entirely clear on this point, but it suggests that 
masterpieces might merit a level of First Amendment protection that lesser 
works do not deserve. 352  That cannot be the law. 353  At the very least, it 
misunderstands how the Supreme Court has treated First Amendment 
coverage: not by evaluating the quality of individual artworks, setting some line 
above which coverage is granted, but instead by considering individual 
mediums of expression. The problem with Kleinman’s junked car isn’t its 
quality as an artwork. The problem is that junked cars, or junked car planters, 
are not traditional mediums of expression. 
The courts in Bery and Mastrovincenzo—the street vending cases—
understood this, at least on some level. In Bery, the Second Circuit refused to 
distinguish the Supreme Court’s case law on film, theater, and instrumental 
music from that about parades, marches, and sit-ins. 354  In describing the 
expressive value of visual forms of communication, the Bery court mentioned 
not just Winslow Homer, but non-art examples like the pictorial 
representations in written languages such as Chinese and Nahuatl.355 This is all 
to say that the Second Circuit did not treat arthood as a necessary requirement 
for First Amendment coverage. The mediums of expression it emphasized went 
beyond those used solely or even primarily by artists. 
The reason the Fifth Circuit cited the Second Circuit’s vendor cases in 
Kleinman, however, was because both courts realized that arthood cannot be a 
sufficient condition any more than it can be a necessary condition for First 
Amendment coverage. 356  Both courts were grappling with the fact that 
arguments of the form “x is an artwork, thus protected from regulation” are 
untenable.357 If anything can be art, anything can benefit from an art exemption. 
By contrast, not anything can be a painting, photograph, print, or sculpture—
the mediums of expression protected in Bery. The Fifth Circuit may have 
 
 350. Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
 353. See Soucek, Aesthetic Judgment, supra note 36, at 456–58 (arguing that the First Amendment is 
least permissive of aesthetic judgment in law in cases where the removal or destruction of an artwork 
is at stake). 
 354. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 694 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 355. Id. at 695. 
 356. Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 326–27. 
 357. Id. at 327; Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 92 (2d Cir. 2006) (“To say that 
the First Amendment protects the sale or dissemination of all objects ranging from ‘totem poles’ . . . 
to television sets does not take us far in trying to articulate or understand a jurisprudence of ordered 
liberty; indeed, it would entirely drain the First Amendment of meaning.” (citation omitted)). 
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misunderstood the medium-based distinction drawn by the Second Circuit, but 
it certainly grasped the need for a distinction narrower than just “art.” 
The jumble of tests employed in right of privacy/publicity and trademark 
cases shows a similar move and confusion. 358  The allure of “x is art, thus 
protected” arguments proves strong, as lower court decisions in the Arne 
Svenson privacy case and the Ginger Rogers false advertising case both show.359 
But as Section I.B.1 described, the principal tests that have emerged in the 
appellate courts look not to a work’s status as art, but to its transformative 
nature, or to the extent to which someone’s name or likeness is related to the 
meaning of the work. 360 These are tests that are neither limited to art nor 
automatically satisfied by anything that counts as an artwork.361 
B. Clarifying Future Cases 
Although the concept of art does no work in the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment cases, advocates haven’t stopped relying on it when seeking 
exemptions there. Far from it. 
When the rap threat case, Knox, was before the Supreme Court on a 
petition for certiorari,362 the rapper was supported not just by the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 363  but by “rap artists,” “music 
 
 358. See supra Section I.B.1; see also supra note 142 (describing the relation between privacy- and 
publicity-related causes of action). 
 359. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 120–21 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Having determined that 
the speech in question is artistic expression, whether there were alternate avenues open to Fellini to 
convey his film’s message is not subject to examination by this court. Because the speech at issue here 
is not primarily intended to serve a commercial purpose, the prohibitions of the Lanham Act do not 
apply . . . .”), aff’d, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); Foster v. Svenson, No. 651826/2013, 2013 WL 
3989038, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2013) (“Art is considered free speech and is therefore protected 
by the First Amendment.”). 
 360. See supra Section I.B.1; see also Post & Rothman, supra note 134, at 156–62 (describing various 
tests courts have developed in attempting to distinguish public discourse from commodities in right of 
publicity cases). 
 361. In fact, it is difficult to determine what role even mediums of expression play in right of 
publicity cases. Post and Rothman claim that when people’s names or images “appear in a traditionally 
recognized ‘medium for the communication of ideas,’ such as fine art, film, newspapers, radio, or books, 
courts are comfortable classifying them as presumptively public discourse” and offering First 
Amendment protection. Post & Rothman, supra note 134, at 159. But what happens when drawings or 
paintings are employed “outside of traditional media, as for instance on t-shirts and coffee mugs”—or 
chewable dog toys? Id. at 160; cf. VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props., Inc., 953 F.3d 1170, 1175 
(9th Cir. 2020) (finding that “the Bad Spaniels dog toy, although surely not the equivalent of the Mona 
Lisa, is an expressive work”). I am grateful to Robert Post, Betsy Rosenblatt, and Felix Wu for helping 
me see, though not solve, the difficulties in these cases. 
 362. See supra Section I.A.2. 
 363. Motion for Leave to File Brief of Amicus Curiae and Brief of the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1, Commonwealth v. Knox, 
190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019) (No. 18-
949). 
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industry representatives,” and “leading rap music scholars,”364 as well as the “art 
scholars and historians” who, as described above, argued that “[a]rt does not 
manifest in the real.”365 
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the brief for Phillips literally begins by 
mentioning his “love for art and design” and his goal of creating “an art gallery 
of cakes.” 366  It describes him as “an artist using cake as his canvas with 
Masterpiece as his studio.”367 And it claims that the First Amendment protects 
Phillips from complying with Colorado public accommodation law “because his 
wedding cakes . . . are his artistic expression.”368 At oral argument, the bulk of 
the time on Masterpiece Cakeshop’s side was spent distinguishing just who is 
an artist: Florists? Jewelers? Invitation designers? Hair stylists? Chefs? Tailors? 
Someone who does makeup?369 As Justice Kagan joked, the latter is “called an 
artist. It’s the makeup artist.”370 
Nearly all of this was a waste of time. As this final section aims to show, 
cases that include artistic exemption claims—including some of the more 
prominent ones that have and will soon come before the Supreme Court—
would appear quite different if the concept of art were never mentioned. This 
is the payoff of this Article’s normative argument. We now can see that talk of 
art in these cases is not just hopelessly vague or undefined; it affirmatively 
misleads courts away from the real issues that are at stake. Three illustrations 
of this follow. 
1.  Rapped Threats 
Consider Knox first. 371  The strong version of the art exemption claim 
offered there argued that a threat made in rap cannot be criminalized, for rap is 
art, and art is something set apart from everyday reality. In the words of the art 
scholars and historians who filed a brief supporting Knox in the Supreme Court, 
“A painting, poem, sculpture, or song may be consistent with reality, but that 
does not mean that it is reality.”372 For that reason, they asserted, “it has long 
 
 364. Knox, Brief of Render, supra note 88, at 1, 4. 
 365. Knox, Brief for Art Scholars, supra note 88, at 8. 
 366. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Brief for Petitioners, supra note 207, at 1, 2017 WL 3913762, at *1. 
 367. Id. 
 368. Id. (emphasis added). 
 369. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–20, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017) (No. 16-111). The transcript notes seventeen uses of the word 
“artist(s),” seven of “artistic,” six of “art,” seven of “artisan(s),” and three of “artistry.” Id. at 103. 
 370. Id. at 12. 
 371. For background, see supra Section I.A.2. 
 372. Knox, Brief for Art Scholars, supra note 88, at 8. 
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been understood that expressions or depictions of violence in art are not 
intended to bring about the violence they depict.”373 
The hyperbole characteristic of rap 374  may have seeped into the art 
scholars’ brief. For their claim can’t literally be true. The very point of some 
songs—think of “La Marseillaise,”375 for example—is to bring about the bloody 
resistance it describes. Historically, entire artistic movements have been built 
around depicting and inspiring violence.376 In the present day, the U.S. Army 
creates video games not just for training but for recruitment—to find people 
willing “to bring about the violence [the video games] depict.”377 
In none of these cases is the call to violence any less real because it is made 
through a work of art. In fact, the artistic quality of the call might make it even 
more inspiring—just think how the music of “La Marseillaise” causes bar 
patrons to rise together in Casablanca’s most moving scene.378 
At the same time, plenty of statements that could be understood as threats 
in some contexts clearly aren’t in other contexts—whether in songs or theatrical 
performances, stand-up routines or games of make believe. A joke isn’t 
somehow set apart from reality, as some said of art in Knox; it simply provides 
a context in which we have (defeasible) reasons for not taking a statement 
literally. Arthood is neither necessary nor sufficient for taking a statement out 
of the realm of threats. The concept of art does no work in this. 
Of course, as described above, the conventions of a given medium (say, of 
theater) or genre (for example, rap) likely are relevant factors to consider in 
determining whether someone working in that medium or genre is threatening. 
 
 373. Id.; see also id. at 12 (“[T]he fact that rap roots itself firmly in the real does not make it any 
less representational (or any more real) than other forms of violent artistic expression that are entitled 
to First Amendment protection.”). 
 374. See id. at 9 (“Rap also relies on hyperbole far more heavily than most other comparable forms 
of expression.”). 
 375. What’s the Meaning of La Marseillaise?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/ 
news/magazine-34843770 [https://perma.cc/68D3-RYJY]. 
 376. According to the poet Filippo Tommaso Marinetti’s “Manifesto for Futurism,” which he 
described as a “manifesto of ruinous and incendiary violence”: “We want to glorify war—the only cure 
for the world—militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of the anarchists, the beautiful ideas 
which kill, and contempt for woman.” Barbara Pozzo, Masculinity Italian Style, 13 NEV. L.J. 585, 598 
n.106 (2013) (quoting F.T. MARINETTI, THE FUTURIST MANIFESTO (James Joll trans.)). See generally 
THE VIOLENT MUSE: VIOLENCE AND THE ARTISTIC IMAGINATION IN EUROPE, 1910–39 (Jana 
Howlett & Rod Mengham eds., 1994) (explicating “the close relationship between violence and 
experimental art”). 
 377. Knox, Brief for Art Scholars, supra note 88, at 8. See generally Mike Thompson, More Than 
Call of Duty – Killing in the Name of: The US Army and Video Games, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 1, 2019, 11:52 
AM), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2019/01/army-video-games/ [https://perma.cc/U2UX-7KFQ] 
(explaining how the U.S. Army uses video games). Thanks to Darren Hudson Hick for this example. 
 378. See Madeleine Lebeau: The Face of La Marseillaise in Casablanca, IRISH TIMES, 
https://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/people/madeleine-lebeau-the-face-of-la-marseillaise-in-
casablanca-1.2657566 [https://perma.cc/FK3R-5HJ9] (May 23, 2016, 12:06 PM) (describing the 
scene); CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942). 
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Just as someone unfamiliar with traditional theatrical conventions might not 
understand that the person on stage is playing a role, so too might those who 
know little about rap fail to realize that the genre is “(in)famous for its 
exaggerated, sometimes violent rhetoric.” 379  Understanding how hyperbole, 
slang, and violence are standardly employed within a genre—whether rap or 
reggae or country380—can determine whether we hear a lyric as a threat, a 
confession, a clever rhyme, or fanciful role-play. Put more vividly, getting 
“body-bagged” takes on a different meaning in a rap lyric than in a police 
report. 381  Practitioners and scholars of the genre can play a crucial role in 
educating courts and juries about the genre’s conventions, thereby helping them 
understand the context that could be essential for determining meaning. 
In Knox, some experts did exactly this. 382  But even as they did this 
important work, they felt the need to insist that rap is “a form of artistic 
expression” 383—that Knox’s rap “is a work of poetry.” 384  Advocates clearly 
worried that rap, arising from marginalized communities, would not be taken 
seriously in court unless it were brought within the mantle of poetry, or better, 
art. They wanted courts to accept that rap is art, and art cannot be criminalized 
even when some find it threatening.385 
But this isn’t the right argument. Many rappers are undeniably artists; 
whether Knox is among them doesn’t matter to his case.386 What matters is that 
Knox was working within a genre of song in which violent exaggeration is a 
standard convention. This is a fact that has to be taken into account when 
interpreting Knox’s rap lyrics. Genre conventions affect how words should 
 
 379. Knox, Brief of Render, supra note 88, at 19. 
 380. See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 302 (5th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 799 
F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Presumably, [listeners] would [not] believe that Johnny Cash literally ‘shot 
a man . . . just to watch him die.’ Nor would [listeners] likely conclude . . . that Bob Marley ‘shot the 
sheriff’ but spared the deputy’s life.”); Commonwealth v. Gray, 978 N.E.2d 543, 561 (Mass. 2012) 
(same); Andrea Dennis, Poetic (In)Justice? Rap Music Lyrics as Art, Life, and Criminal Evidence, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 15–16 (2007) (“[W]e accept that these artists [are] making purely artistic 
statements.”). 
 381. See Amici Curiae Brief of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project and Rap Music 
Scholars (Professors Erik Nielson and Charis E. Kubrin) in Support of Petitioner at 10, Elonis v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2014) (No. 13-983) (“[I]n rap battles . . . it is common to use the term 
‘body bag’ to describe an opponent’s victory over an adversary (e.g., ‘you just got body-bagged’).”). 
 382. See Knox, Brief of Render, supra note 88, at 19. 
 383. Id. at 2. 
 384. Id. at 19. 
 385. See, e.g., NIELSON & DENNIS, supra note 81, at 114 (“[I]t has become apparent that rapper 
defendants are not considered legitimate artists and rap music does not merit the artistic recognition 
granted to other forms of art. This perspective helps courts justify weaker First Amendment 
protections.”). 
 386. Here is one difference between Knox, where I take the artistic status of rap to be indisputable, 
and Masterpiece Cakeshop, where the artistic status of cakes is dubious—but similarly irrelevant, which is 
the point. 
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reasonably be heard. This, rather than rap’s artistic status, is what should make 
a difference in determining whether any particular rap is truly threatening.387 
The impulse to insist on rap’s artistic status is understandable, even 
necessary if you begin with the following assumptions: (1) that art is a protected 
category in American constitutional law, given special status because of its 
unique value; and (2) that the homogeneity of the judiciary makes it less likely 
that judges will value art forms, like rap, that arise in communities other than 
theirs.388 The second assumption is surely correct. The first is not. 
Given the limits of its experience, the judiciary likely needs experts’ help, 
first, in identifying mediums of expression that are new—or new to many of 
our judges. As I argued at the end of Part II, traditional mediums of expression 
should be picked out and privileged not just because they are traditional. 
(Traditional for whom?) Rather, certain mediums may have become traditional, 
where they have, because they express so efficiently, with so little nonexpressive 
remainder. 389  Experts can help courts identify new mediums in which this 
occurs. Second, judges and juries may need help understanding the genre 
conventions that shape what gets expressed in any given medium. This is the 
work so necessary in the rap trials. Importantly, though, neither of these efforts 
involves convincing judges that a certain expression deserves the honorific “art.” 
2.  Race-Based Casting 
Medium matters in a different way when it comes to the exemptions from 
antidiscrimination laws claimed by television shows, movies, and theatrical 
productions. Examples of these include the case against The Bachelor franchise, 
sued for casting White leads in its first two dozen seasons; the slippery slope 
arguments made to the Supreme Court by cable operators warning about 
imposing colorblind casting on the musical Hamilton; and, in fact, claims by the 
cable operators themselves, who argued that they should be able to consider race 
in developing their channel roster.390 
On my reading, Hamilton should have a First Amendment right to cast 
minority actors as the Founding Fathers and The Bachelor should be able to 
promote an antimiscegenationist message—at least if it is willing to admit that 
as its aim. By contrast, a clothing store like Abercrombie & Fitch shouldn’t get 
an exemption from Title VII’s prohibition on race and religious discrimination 
in order to protect its “brand messaging,” even if that messaging involves a 
 
 387. To say this is not to deny the legal system’s failures in presenting judges and juries with the 
contextual knowledge needed to understand the genre conventions of rap. For an extensive survey of 
these failures, see generally NIELSON & DENNIS, supra note 18, at 101–20. 
 388. See Root et al., supra note 201 (discussing the demographics of the federal judiciary). 
 389. See supra p. 730.  
 390. See supra notes 232–34 and accompanying text. 
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multisensory, immersive, even theatrical in-store experience.391 And the cable 
operators before the Court last Term didn’t merit an exemption either. The 
difference turns on the nature and, as importantly, the boundaries of traditional 
mediums of expression. 
To see why, return to Hurley, the Supreme Court’s deepest engagement 
with expressive mediums and antidiscrimination law. In asking whether 
Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade organizers could exclude a group of gay Irish 
Americans, the Supreme Court focused on the inherently expressive nature of 
parades: their expressiveness is the very thing that makes parades different than 
ordinary walks.392 To force the organizers to include certain marchers would be 
to control the expressive content of their march.393 It would force a change to the 
organizers’ message no less than a law that dictated what elements a composer 
could include in their score.394 
Notably, the unanimous Court in Hurley distinguished parades from cable 
operators who, although covered under the First Amendment, 395  employ a 
medium with much different conventions. Cable operators are generally seen 
as conduits for the messaging of the individual channels that they offer for their 
customers to flip through. 396  The cable network itself does not offer any 
overarching, unified message—unlike parades, which tend to have a point.397 
Theater, like parades, is an inherently expressive medium. In fact, as 
Section II.C described, theater is recognized as a traditional medium of 
expression in part because it exists for little reason other than to express.398 To 
change the casting of Hamilton is to alter the very point or meaning of the show. 
Hurley prohibits antidiscrimination law from compelling that kind of change. 
To be sure, some implicit balancing is occurring here. A theatrical production’s 
expressive interests would undoubtedly fail to trump laws against statutory rape 
or cocaine use on stage, even if producers said that their show’s realism required 
it. By contrast, statutory carve outs do exist in some places to exempt theaters 
from laws like public smoking bans, at least when smoking is “an integral part 
of the story.”399 
 
 391. Abercrombie & Fitch’s “Look Policy” has been the subject of numerous lawsuits, including 
an appearance-based religious accommodation claim that reached the Supreme Court. See Brief for 
Respondent at 8, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015) (No. 14-86) 
[hereinafter Abercrombie, Brief for Respondent]. 
 392. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos. Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995). 
 393. See id. at 572–73. 
 394. See id. at 574–75. 
 395. Id. at 570. 
 396. Id. at 576. 
 397. Id. at 576–77. 
 398. See supra p. 730 (“There is just not much else you can do with an opera, symphony, ballet, or 
novel but enjoy its aesthetic qualities.”). 
 399. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5(e)(4) (2021). 
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A brilliant comedy sketch shows why exemptions like these for traditional 
mediums of expression require some rigorous boundary policing. An episode of 
the Comedy Central show Nathan For You tried to help a dive bar skirt the 
smoking ban in Pasadena by setting up a few audience seats on the side of the 
room, thereby turning the entire space into a “boundary-pushing theatrical 
experience” where the regular bargoers and staff were the unwitting performers, 
suddenly allowed to smoke for the night.400 “What’s the loophole?” someone 
asks. “Theater law,” the show’s host answers.401 
The sketch turns art exemptions into comedy, but serious examples are 
easy to imagine. Abercrombie & Fitch aims for an immersive, transporting, 
sensory experience in its stores, but to achieve its desired look and feel, the 
company has in the past engaged in race and religious discrimination.402 Giving 
Hamilton an exemption from Title VII’s prohibition on race discrimination 
shouldn’t mean that Abercrombie & Fitch merits an exemption too, even if the 
retailer stresses the “theatrical” nature of its in-store experience. Hamilton is 
theater; Abercrombie & Fitch stores are not. Again, part of the reason 
traditional mediums of expression have attained that status is because they do 
so little but express. Even when that expression is for sale—Hamilton tickets do 
not come cheap403—people are paying for the expression; the expression is not 
meant, as with Abercrombie, primarily to get them to buy clothing.404 
What is emerging here are a few guiding principles for granting 
exemptions from antidiscrimination laws. First, traditional mediums of 
expression should receive favored treatment when it comes to exemptions 
because they are inherently expressive—in fact, many exist for little reason 
other than to express. 
Second, the boundaries of these mediums have to be fairly rigorously 
policed. This will sound like anathema to many contemporary artists and media 
studies scholars, and the conservatism of the approach is admittedly not one of 
its more attractive features. But the point is to protect theater, not just anything 
 
 400. Kimberley Mcleod, “That Felt Real to Me”: When Reality Theatre and Reality Television Collide, 
39 THEATRE RSCH. CANADA / RECHERCHES THÉÂTRALES AU CANADA 209, 218 (2018). 
 401. Joshua Alston, Nathan For You Finally Becomes Full-Blown Experimental Theater, AV CLUB 
(Nov. 11, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://tv.avclub.com/nathan-for-you-finally-becomes-full-blown-
experimental-1798185644 [https://perma.cc/3N2M-HH49]. 
 402. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031, 2034 (2015); cf. EEOC 
Agrees to Landmark Resolution of Discrimination Case Against Abercrombie & Fitch, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Nov. 18, 2004), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/11-18-04.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/6357-W5AA] (“[I]ndustries need to know that businesses cannot discriminate against 
individuals under the auspice of a marketing strategy or a particular ‘look.’”). 
 403. Amanda Harding, ‘Hamilton’ Tickets Are Still Ridiculously Expensive – But Why?, SHOWBIZ 
CHEATSHEET (Sept. 21, 2019), https://www.cheatsheet.com/entertainment/hamilton-tickets-are-
still-ridiculously-expensive-but-why.html/ [https://perma.cc/XZ27-KA55]. 
 404. See Abercrombie, Brief for Respondent, supra note 391, at 7 (describing how Abercrombie & 
Fitch uses its in-store experience in lieu of advertising). 
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“theatrical.” As the previous point observed, the recognized mediums were 
recognized in large part because they express so efficiently, with so little 
remainder. Sculpture is recognized because, as traditionally practiced, its 
materiality is generally safe, and its only intended purpose is to be looked at. 
When junked cars or cakes are used instead of stone and marble, or when the 
“sculpture” is meant to be eaten rather than simply viewed, the calculus changes. 
Further, enforcement costs and incentives for pretextual exemption claims are 
far less when someone stages a play in a theater or a show at a gallery than when 
they label an event or thing in the outside world, especially the commercial 
world, “performance art” or an “installation.” However unsatisfying boundary 
policing of this sort will be, the real question is whether it is better than the 
alternatives of either no exemptions or unbounded ones. 
Finally, the whole point of exemptions is to protect the expressive 
interests—the messaging or meaning-making—of the one seeking the 
exemption. If expressive content is unlikely to be imputed to the one seeking 
the exemption, or if elements of the expressive object can be changed without 
greatly changing the overarching message, exemptions are not needed. This is 
what the Supreme Court has said of the disparate collection of channels 
provided by cable operators: changes in content won’t necessarily alter any 
overarching message imputed to the operator, so a blanket First Amendment 
defense is inappropriate.405 Relatedly, if a speaker disclaims the very message 
for which they seek First Amendment protection, there is little value served by 
providing an exemption—even to a work within an otherwise shielded medium 
of expression. The producers of The Bachelor should not be allowed to dodge a 
race discrimination lawsuit by saying both that their show has no racial message 
and that the First Amendment protects racist television shows. The latter is true 
but, by The Bachelor’s own lights, irrelevant to its expressive interests—the very 
thing the First Amendment is there to protect. 
3.  Wedding Vendors 
We return at last to Masterpiece Cakeshop. To get First Amendment 
protection from Colorado’s public accommodations laws, Phillips had three 
options: try to fit his cakes into one of the traditional, recognized mediums of 
expression; argue that cakes should be recognized as their own medium of 
expression, much as movies and video games have been;406 or skip past mediums 
entirely and argue directly that his cakes should be protected because they are 
works of art. 
If this Article has done anything, it is to call this last strategy into question. 
I have already described the problems with the baker’s attempted art exemption 
 
 405. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994). 
 406. See supra notes 307–22 and accompanying text. 
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claim, 407 which has outlived his case. (Facing another discrimination claim, 
Phillips asked in a recent newspaper editorial: “Can I just be a cake artist 
again?”)408 
Assuming art’s constitutional irrelevance, Phillips is left needing either to 
fit his cake making into one of the recognized mediums of expression or to 
establish cakes as a medium of their own. Both suggestions were made in the 
briefing. The “479 Creative Professionals” who supported Phillips argued that 
“[i]n lieu of watercolors or pastels, Phillips uses fondant icing or frosting . . . . 
The cake itself acts as his canvas and conveys his message.”409 The Solicitor 
General suggested that a wedding cake was “akin to a sculptural centerpiece.”410 
These kinds of argument raise the same worries Abercrombie & Fitch did 
above: the store’s brand messaging might have been theatrical, but it was not 
actually theater. Similarly, a cake’s surface might offer a “canvas,” its decoration 
might be “painterly,” and its shape might be “sculptural,” but those are 
metaphors, not classifications. 
The most sustained effort to treat cakes as a medium of expression, not 
just metaphorically akin to one, came from a richly illustrated amicus brief by a 
dozen or so “cake artists” who wrote not in support of either party but of the 
proposition that their work merits “as much protection as those who work in 
other mediums.” 411  Acknowledging that cake making is not a “historically 
established” medium,412 amici described their cakes “as edible vehicles to convey 
messages and emotions.”413 More than mere bakers, cake artists 
must have visual-arts skills to design a cake that is pleasing to the eye—
painting, drawing, and sculpting. They need the skills of an interior 
designer to create a unified whole from a series of individually artistic 
elements. They require the grace and technical powers of an architect, so 
that the final product moves from the theoretical to the real.414 
Admirable in this argument is its attempt to analogically extend previously 
recognized mediums, as we have seen the Supreme Court recently do with video 
games. 415  What this argument lacks is consideration of whether cakes are 
inherently expressive—like parades, songs, or handbills—or whether their 
 
 407. See supra Section I.B.3. 
 408. Phillips, supra note 22. 
 409. Brief of 479 Creative Professionals as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017) (No. 16-111). 
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expressiveness is something variable, occasionally added on, or perhaps gained 
through context or use. It may be relevant to consider, in the language of Part 
II, how efficient cakes are as mediums for expressing ideas: Can they be said to 
express without remainder, like poetry, which does almost nothing but express? 
These questions are important because it is the “remainder”—the 
nonexpressive aspect of cakes (the tasty, fattening, ingested parts)—that the law 
is most likely and legitimately wanting to regulate. Insofar as those 
nonexpressive aspects dominate, cakes become hard to distinguish from any 
other product or service in the commercial wedding market. Rented tables too 
can be celebratory when they are festooned with linens and decorations and 
surrounded by wedding guests, but adding expressive elements or context to 
tables does not make tables a medium of expression. Requiring the table rental 
company to work with people of all races, religions, or sexual orientations affects 
the tables’ use, not their meaning. 
At this point it might help to recall some of what has already been argued: 
• Recognized mediums are inherently and often efficiently expressive, 
and this is what makes First Amendment law generally more 
solicitous of items within those mediums than it is of other kinds of 
items or activities.416 
• The conventions of a medium can help determine the expressive 
content of items within that medium.417 
• Laws forcing a change in that expressive content will have a hard 
time surviving First Amendment scrutiny . . .418 
• . . . unless they are laws that target a given medium’s distinctive 
harms. Marches, but not novels, have a tendency to disrupt traffic; 
compared to bad poetry, bad architecture can be both more 
dangerous and harder to avoid. Size regulations will thus receive far 
different scrutiny when applied to marches and buildings than to 
books.419 
• Finally, worries that generally applicable laws might force changes 
to expressive content within a medium really amount to worries 
about forced changes to someone’s expression. If—perhaps due to the 
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medium conventions just mentioned—the expression isn’t likely to 
be attributed to that someone, the worry disappears.420 
These principles focus our attention on particular aspects of what are 
admittedly still difficult cases, whether they be about cakes, limo drivers, 
caterers, florists, calligraphers, or photographers.421 The fact that some wedding 
vendors are operating within a recognized medium of expression may well 
matter, as Carpenter and Volokh have argued.422 But if so, this is because works 
within such mediums tend to be inherently meaningful, and accommodation 
laws could potentially force a change in that meaning—which is to say, in the 
expressive content attributable to the work’s creator. Whether it actually does 
or not, however, requires us to consider medium conventions both to determine 
which elements of works in that medium are typically seen as meaningful and 
to decide whether that meaning typically gets attributed to the author. Laws 
that require new or customized expressive content will likely be most 
vulnerable, 423  though even there, questions remain about whether the 
expressive content is tied to the maker, or whether the maker is simply seen as 
facilitating the expression of others.424 
As the Court said in Masterpiece Cakeshop, “The free speech aspect of 
th[ese] case[s] is difficult.”425 The difficulty hasn’t gone away. The principles 
above don’t change the fact that these are complicated, fact-intensive decisions. 
Courts, advocates, and scholars just need to realize that the decisions and the 
difficulties have nothing to do with determining whether a cake, or anything 
else, is a work of art. 
CONCLUSION 
It has long been thought obvious that if something is art, it must be 
covered by the First Amendment. This Article has aimed to show just how 
widespread that belief is and how sweeping its implications can be. The reach 
of privacy, trademark, and tax laws; the ability to turn away LGBTQ couples 
from your business or take race into account in your hiring; the regulation of 
street vending and land use; the criminalization of threatening language—all of 
these turn in part on the success of artistic exemption claims. It surely matters, 
then, whether the conventional wisdom is correct: whether art really is a 
category of things and activities the U.S. Constitution specially protects. 
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The conventional wisdom about art and the Constitution is wrong. This 
is the second thing this Article has aimed to show. To be sure, lots of artworks 
are covered under the First Amendment but not because of their arthood. Art is 
not, and should not be, a constitutionally relevant concept. 
The problem with the conventional wisdom is not just that the concept of 
art lacks defined, judicially administrable boundaries—though it does. Worse is 
the fact that the various objects and activities that (arguably) fall within those 
boundaries lack any common, defining trait that would suggest why those things, 
rather than others, deserve exemptions from otherwise applicable laws. 
Rather than asking whether something is art, the Supreme Court has long 
emphasized mediums of expression instead. Use of a recognized medium 
triggers more robust balancing of the medium’s expressive value against the 
government’s interest in regulation. Because mediums of expression are 
differentiated in large part by their materiality—the very thing the government 
is most likely and legitimately wanting to regulate—focusing on them allows 
courts to vary their scrutiny based on the varied nonexpressive dangers each 
medium poses. Shifting attention from art to mediums of expression thus 
foregrounds a set of concepts that are better cabined and more relevant to the 
law’s concerns than the concept of art.  
Mediums of expression remain surprisingly underdiscussed, however, 
both in scholarship and in the courts. The assumption that arthood matters to 
the Constitution seems to have occluded any sustained examination of the 
concepts that are doing so much of the real constitutional work. Questions 
remain about how mediums should be defined, which should be recognized, and 
in what ways “each may present its own problems” for the law.426 We need more 
clarity about how mediums should be individuated, when new mediums deserve 
to be recognized, and what biases—whether based on race, gender, geography, 
class or just the inertia of tradition—might keep the law from recognizing 
expressive mediums already in use. This Article provokes those questions more 
than it has settled them. But to better understand mediums of expression and 
the legal exemptions they might sometimes merit, the law first needs to move 
beyond the concept of art. We need to see “art” as the constitutional irrelevance 
that it is. 
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